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Abstract 
 
This paper mainly focuses on finding optimal strategies for the development of 
microfinance in Korea and on predicting the impact of microfinance in the future. 
First, this paper reviews and assesses the impact of microfinance in Korea. I suggested 
that recent phenomena of income polarization and credit rationing in the financial market are 
evidence that microfinance is needed in Korea. Although the Korean economy has made great 
strides, the difference in the income between the poor and the rich has gotten much greater. The 
foreign currency crisis in 1997 deepened income polarization and the impact is continuing. 
Banks choose to ration credit instead of increasing interest rate (when there was an excess 
demand for loans) which would lead adverse selection and moral hazards. The poor are in an 
inferior position when it comes to getting funds when credit ration happens because they cannot 
offer collateral and they need money urgently.  
This paper analyzes the factors which impact up on the survival of microenterprises using 
two econometric methods (the logit regression model and the Cox proportional hazard model). 
Attributes of microenterprises, such as organizational form, sex of the owner(s), income level of 
the owner(s), and types of business are chosen as independent variables which may have impact 
on the survival. The results from the econometric models indicate that more support should be 
provided when the income level of the owner(s) became less if we want to make more 
microenterprises survive. The direction of impact or the relative magnitudes of impact is not 
exactly the same between two econometric methods. Therefore, proper interpretation and fine 
tuning are needed in applying the results into the real microcredit world. 
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Next, this paper outlines the impact of microfinance on the income level of the poor and 
the repayment ratio of microcredit. This task is carried out by a simulation which is an agent 
based model. The simulation of the agent based model shows that two different policy directions 
are needed to guarantee the success of microfinance. First, it is necessary to magnify positive 
impacts. There are at least two ways this can be done. You can increase the amount of 
microcredit to make it easier to start businesses and you can support an increase in the yield rate 
of return. Minimizing negative impacts is also important. This can be done by decreasing the 
interest rate charged by local money lenders and closely monitoring their behavior to see if they 
obey the usury law. 
Finally, I proposed several optimal strategies for the development of microfinance in the 
future. (1) Introducing and enforcing group lending, because group lending can solve two major 
problems in microfinance, adverse selection by assortative matching and moral hazard by 
monitoring group members’ transactions. (2) Letting MFIs (Microfinance Institutions) carry out 
both microsaving and microinsurance. (3) Establishing independent committees to mediate 
disputes regarding microcredit issues, which can solve commitment problem. (4) Expanding 
microfinance services by letting MFIs handle housing microfinance and loans for education and 
health care. (5) Encouraging social enterprise to help the poor overcome their state of poverty. 
In conclusion, appropriate social objectives and forward looking entrepreneurship when 
properly supported by MFIs can bring remarkable progress in social integration and help the 
poor overcome their state of poverty. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Microfinance has played a key role in helping citizens out of poverty in the past 
25 years since it was introduced in Bangladesh by Muhammad Yunus in the mid 1970s. 
Microfinance has helped the poor improve their economic situation by providing a small 
amount of loans which they used to start their own microenterprises and survive tough 
economic times caused by various factors. Yunus’ winning Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 
was an indication of widespread enthusiasm around the world for microfinance.  
Korea is not an exception. Recent phenomena of income polarization and credit 
rationing in the financial market are evidence that microfinance is needed in Korea. The 
foreign currency crisis in 1997 deepened income polarization and the impact is 
continuing. This is the reason why government circles as well as the academic world 
have shown a fierce interest in microfinance as a means to help the poor.  
Many questions have been raised lately about the effectiveness of microfinance. 
For example, Roodman and Morduch (2009) suggest that a replication exercise shows the 
impact of the previous studies which concluded that microcredit helped the poor is week.  
Based on the experience of the other countries, microfinance has been played as 
finance and empowerment. Korea today is, however, different from a rural, individual 
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and subsistence economy such as Bangladesh (which motivates much Microfinance 
work). The current role of microfinance institutions (referred to here as “MFIs”) in 
helping the poor out of the poverty trap, however, is weaker in Korea than it is in other 
countries. Hence the institutions and procedures that apply in such a society need to be 
re-thought. This thesis is a connected attempt to rethink the issues, particularly with 
respect to Korea. 
There are no systematic studies on microfinance in Korea, so in a sense 
everything is new, but some aspects of this dissertation are new even methodologically. 
A minor novelty is the use of econometric tests for microenterprise survival and a major 
innovation is the design of agent based model (referred to here as “ABM”) to describe 
and evaluate the microfinance. The primary thrust is, however, to get policy level 
statements that may be useful in guiding economic policies to combat poverty. 
This dissertation mainly focuses on finding optimal strategies for the development 
of microfinance in Korea and on predicting the impact of microfinance in the future. For 
that purpose, chapter 2 covers why microfinance is needed and reviews the current state 
of microfinance in Korea. Chapter 3 presents analysis of existing data regarding the 
outcome of microenterprises in Korea. Two econometric methods (the logit regression 
model and the Cox proportional hazard model) are used in an exploratory study of the 
survival of microenterprises in Korea. Chapter 4 discusses an agent based model of 
microfinance, which shows the future impact of microfinance. Chapter 5 discusses 
various plans for the future of microfinance in Korea. Chapter 6 presents a summary of 
the findings. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Review of the Impact of Microfinance in Korea 
 
This chapter mainly focuses on reviewing and assessing the impact of 
microfinance in Korea. This chapter consists of 5 sections. Section 1 discusses the need 
for microfinance in Korea and section 2 addresses the current state of microfinance in 
Korea.  Section 3 covers the use of financial markets by the poor and section 4 reviews 
the existing microfinance institutions in Korea.  
2.1 Why Microfinance is needed? 
Microfinance so far has been an effective means for getting people out of extreme 
poverty in less developed countries. Although the overall Korean economy has grown 
greatly since the 1960s, there is still a need for microfinance in Korea, because of the 
recent phenomena of income polarization and credit rationing in the loan market. In the 
following subsections, I will explain these phenomena in detail. 
2.1.1 Poverty in Korea 
2.1.1.1 Poverty Reduction in Past Decades 
Korea has made remarkable progress in reducing poverty during the past decades. 
It was possible through successful government policies which mainly focused on an 
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agricultural development project, Saemaul Undong, and labor intensive industrialization 
from 1970 ~ 1985. Thanks to steady economic growth, poverty has been continuously 
reduced. The data shown in table 1 suggests that absolute poverty has been virtually 
eliminated in Korea.  
During the last two decades Korea took the lead among Asian countries in 
reducing absolute poverty. According to a poverty study by the World Bank from 1970 to 
1990, Korea’s poverty rates ranked 2nd among Asian countries (see table 2). 
2.1.1.2 Recent Poverty Dynamics 
In this section, I will use actual data to analyze the characteristics and causes of 
recent poverty in Korea. 
2.1.1.2.1 Data Set  
To analyze the recent poverty dynamics in Korea, I used data from 1998 to 2005 
which came from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (referred to here as “KLIPS’) 
that was provided by the Korean Labor Institute. Only the data from households which 
responded to every survey were chosen for the analysis. 
2.1.1.2.2 Trend in Poverty Rate  
I used income level to categorize households. I choose semi ordinary income, 
which is defined as an ordinary income minus government subsides. In 1999, the Korean 
government announced the minimum cost of living for households according to size. This 
in effect was a poverty line. I use the 1999 minimum cost of living figures and changes in 
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price indexes to calculate the absolute poverty line for 1998 and 2000 ~ 2004, which the 
government did not provide.   
Table 3 shows trends in the absolute poverty rate of households from 1998 to 
2004. On average, the absolute poverty rate moved downwards. More specifically, the 
absolute poverty rate for the year 1998 was 23.91% and then it steadily decreased to 
16.80% in 2001. After that it increased for two years and then finally decreased to 16.08% 
in 2004. 
2.1.1.2.3 Causes of Poverty 
In the following two subsections, I will provide information on the causes of 
poverty in Korea. 
2.1.1.2.3.1 General Features of Poverty 
To acquire a general understanding of poor households, I looked at the 
demographics of poverty. Table 4 shows whether or not the households were below the 
poverty and the number of years they were below the poverty line. 45.4% of the 
households were under the poverty line at least once. 14.0% were below the poverty line 
just once while 5.9% were always during the period of this study below the poverty line.  
Note that the experiencing poverty was different depending on sex, age, education 
level, economic activity, and household composition. The number of households that 
experienced at least one year of poverty was greater if (1) the household was led by a 
female, (2) the age of the household leader was above 60, (3) education the household 
leader had was below a high school diploma, (4) the household income was generated by 
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a daily job, the household leader was unemployed or had not entered the labor market, or 
if (5) the household was composed of only a married couple, a single parent with a kid or 
kids or one man.  
2.1.1.2.3.2 Economic Activity and Career Development 
Since households get income from economic activity, I analyze the transition of 
economic activity status to find out the impact of a change in economic activity status on 
household income. Table 5 shows the transition probability of economic activity status 
depending on the level of poverty. We can see that 88.8% of the poor were employed 
maintained employment for the next year while 96.2% of employees who were not poor 
maintained their employment. Analysis shows that 7.0% of the poor left the labor market 
whereas only 2.7% of the non poor left the labor market. Inspection of the data also 
shows that of the poor (those below the poverty line) only 62.3% succeed in finding a job. 
In contrast 74.3% of the non poor were able to find a job. Thus a portion of the 
unemployed poor either still remained unemployed (11.5%) or exited the labor market 
(26.2%). These percentages are much higher than the percentages for the non poor, which 
were 11.0% and 14.7% respectively. From these observations, we can conclude that 
instability in employment and difficulties in getting a job are two of the causes of poverty 
in Korea.  
The difficulty the poor have in finding regular employment makes it hard for 
them to acquire enough income to escape from poverty. Table 6 shows the transition 
probability of economic activity status of the employed depending on their poverty level. 
The possibility that workers who are poor will continue to have regular jobs is just 80.4%, 
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which is much lower than the 91.8% of non poor who will be able to maintain their 
regular job. The possibility that poor workers will shift to unemployment or be forced 
from the labor market is much higher than it is for the non poor. Poor workers with non 
stable jobs, such as temporary or daily jobs, have a lower probability of being able to get 
a regular job than do non poor workers. The probability for the poor and the non poor to 
move from temporary job to a regular job is 3.9% and 20.0% respectively. The 
probability for the poor and the non poor to move a daily job to a regular job is 4.0% and 
7.5% respectively.  
2.1.1.2.4 Do Poverty Traps exist? 
Are there poverty traps in Korea? This question is really difficult to answer, 
because there has not been any research that addresses this question nor has enough data 
on this subject been collected to warrant an investigation of this issue. In the following 
two subsections, I will address two different positions on this issue. 
2.1.1.2.4.1 Frequent Entry and Escape of Poverty  
A change in economic activity status eventually induces a change in household 
income. Table 7 shows the transition probability of the level of household wealth. 46.8% 
of the households, which were poor in a particular year, were still poor the following year, 
while 40.6% of them succeeded in escaping from poverty. 19.9% of households in the 
“less poor” tier were in the poor tier and 62.4% were in the non poor tier the following 
year. Among the non poor households, 5.6% were in the poor tier the following year.  
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These data suggests that both entry into poverty and escape from poverty happens 
frequently in Korea. Note that the entry and escape happens more frequently between the 
poor tier and the non poor tier than between the poor tier (or the non poor tier) and the 
less poor tier. Based on these results, it seems that the durability of poverty in Korea, if it 
occurs, does not usually last a long time. 
2.1.1.2.4.2 State Dependency in Poverty 
Table 8 shows the distribution of non poverty households, poor households with 
just a one year experience of poverty, and poor households which continuously 
experienced poverty, according to household features such as sex, age, education level, 
economic activity, and household composition. The portion of male led households with 
continuous poverty was just 53.2%, while that of households with one year of experience 
with poverty and households in the non poverty group were 92.3% and 93.8% 
respectively. In contrast the portion of female led households in the non poverty group 
was 6.3%, in the one year of experience in poverty group 7.7%, and in the continuous 
poverty group 46.8%. Thus we can say that the possibility of poverty for the households 
with a female leader was greater than for households with a male leader.  
63.5% of the leaders of households in the continuously poor group were not in the 
labor market, whereas 13.4% of the leaders of households in the one year experience of 
poverty group and 6.8% of the leaders of households in the non poverty group were not 
in the labor market. Inspection of the data also shows that 33.3% of the households in the 
continuously poor group were households with only one member. 
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In summary, households with female leaders, households with leaders 60 years of 
age or above, households with leaders that are outside the labor market and households 
that have only one person tend to be poor in Korea. 
2.1.1.3 Income Concentration 
The performance of the Korean economy during the last four decades has been 
outstanding by any international measures. From 1962 to 2005, the Korean economy 
grew at an average annual rate of nearly 7% in real terms. During this time, the 
distribution of income favored the wealthy, and this was regarded as an impediment to 
the unity of society. Especially the foreign currency crisis in 1997 made income 
polarization more significant. The worsened situation has not improved yet. 
In comparing the percentages of different income classes in figure 1, we can see 
that the percentage of the middle class decreased but those of the upper and the lower 
classes increased. The percentages of the lower and the upper classes in 2005 were higher 
by 1.7% and 3.7%, respectively, than those in 1997, while the percentage of the middle 
class decreased 5.3% between the two years. The number who shifted from the middle 
class to the lower class is estimated to be 1,747,000, while the number who moved from 
the middle class to the upper class is estimated to be only 945,000 (Minsungkyu et al., 
2006). 
The main indexes for measuring the inequality in income distribution are the Gini 
coefficient and the income multiplier, which is defined as the ratio of the average income 
of the top 20% in the upper class to that in the lower class. These surprisingly increased 
in 1998 right after the foreign currency crisis. The Gini coefficient in 1998 was 0.32, 
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which is 0.04% higher than that for the previous year. The income multiplier was 5.41 in 
1998 and 5.49 in 1999. (See figure 2 for details.) 
Furthermore, the poverty ratio1 increased steadily after the foreign currency crisis. 
The poverty ratio using either regular income or disposable income shows an increasing 
trend, implying that the number of the poor is steadily increasing. (See figure 3 for 
details.) 
2.1.1.3.1. The Impact of the Foreign Currency Crisis 
Let me briefly look over the impact of the foreign currency crises on the society, 
especially on the psychological impact on the people. Korean society experienced a lot of 
changes after the foreign currency. The foreign currency started to impact on financial 
markets, and then on real economy and finally on individuals’ life through 
unemployment.   
As the real economy was expected to slow down further for a long period of time, 
several social problems emerged at the same time. Many companies laid a lot of 
employees off in the process of restructuring to survive in a new circumstance. As a 
result of layoff, the number of homeless increased and the crimes from the homeless, e.g. 
alcohol addiction and sexual assault, became an object of social concern.  
This widespread layoff also made the idea of a lifelong workplace disappear 
among the employed. The company which they worked for don’t have common interest 
                                                 
1 The poverty ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of people whose income is below the 
minimum cost of living to the total population. 
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anymore. It is needless to say that the instability of job gave a lot of stress to the society 
as a hole. The economic difficulties from layoff, together with several gloomy economic 
indices, such as high exchange rates, high interest rate, high price indices, and low 
growth rate, casted a sense of defeat both to the middle class of income and to the poor. 
This increased in inequality of income distribution and poverty in Korea. These 
phenomena were considered as a huge confusion, because Korean society had been a 
cooperative and egalitarian society. This change, however, cause positive effects on labor 
market. It increased flexibility of labor market and appropriate reward system for effort 
were started to be established.  
Some of the changes of lifestyle in a society became a new tradition and still 
ongoing. The foreign currency crisis made income polarization more significant. The 
worsened situation has not improved yet. 
2.1.2 Credit Rationing 
Credit rationing is another reason why microfinance is necessary in Korea. In this 
section, I analyze the phenomenon of credit rationing in Korea. Before that, I consider the 
notion of the credit rationing equilibrium. 
2.1.2.1 Credit Rationing Equilibrium 
There exists a credit rationing equilibrium because of asymmetric information in 
the credit market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Banks, as suppliers of funds, have inferior 
information on the expected yield on projects compared with the information of 
applicants. If the interest rate increases, then the expected return to banks may decrease. 
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The increased interest rate can induce riskier borrowers to apply for loans, thus 
exacerbating the problem of adverse selection. The increased interest rate also increases 
the relative attractiveness of riskier projects with higher returns and higher probabilities 
of bankruptcy. This is a well-known moral hazard problem, for which a bank’s return 
may be lower. Therefore, banks that want to maximize their expected returns from 
lending money choose to ration credit instead of increasing the interest rate when there is 
an excess demand for loans in the market. 
2.1.2.2 Analysis of Overall Credit Rationing in Korea 
In this section, I estimate the disequilibrium model for bank loan markets by 
maximum likelihood estimation, as suggested by Maddala and Nelson (1974). The 
sample period is from 1987 to 2004. Based on the empirical results, I can identify 
whether there exists excess demand or credit rationing in the bank loan market. 
2.1.2.2.1 Disequilibrium Equations for Bank Loan 
The disequilibrium model for bank loans is composed of the following three 
equations: 
(2.1) Dt = X’1t α + U1t 
(2.2) St = X’2t β + U2t 
(2.3) Qt = Min (Dt, St) 
, where D, S, and Q denote the demand, supply, and actual loan of funds, respectively, 
and X1t and X2t stand for the vector of explanatory variables for demand and supply of 
funds, and the interest rate is included in one of these. Furthermore, U1 and U2 are the 
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disturbances. Equation (2.3) is based on the hypothesis that the short side dominates the 
market if the market is not in equilibrium. 
2.1.2.2.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (see Maddala and Nelson (1974) for details) 
Suppose that the error terms in equation (2.1), the U1ts, are independent and 
identically distributed (iid) with normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ12, 
independently distributed from the errors in equation (2.2), the U2ts, which are assumed 
to be iid with normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ22. Then the probability 
that Qt, the actual loan of funds, belongs to Dt, the demand for funds, is given by: 
(2.4) πt = Pr (Dt < St) 
  = Pr (X’1t α + U1t < X’2t β + U2t) 
  = Pr (U1t – U2t < X’2t β – X’1t α).  
Note that because U1t and U2t are independent normal distributions, then (U1t – 
U2t) has normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2 = σ12 + σ22. 
Let f1(Qt) denote the probability that the demand becomes Qt, let f2(Qt) denote the 
probability that the supply becomes Qt, let F1(Qt) denote the probability that the demand 
is bigger than Qt, and let F2 (Qt) denote the probability that the supply is bigger than Qt. 
Then: 
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(2.5) f1 (Qt) =  
 f2 (Qt) =  
 F1 (Qt) =  
 F2 (Qt) =  
Now the conditional density of Qt if Qt belongs to demand is given by: 
(2.6)  = . 
Similarly, the conditional density of Qt if Qt belongs to supply is given by: 
(2.7) . 
Hence, the unconditional density of Qt can be written as: 
(2.8)       f (Qt I X1t, X2t) = πt [ πt) [  
= . 
Therefore, the likelihood function becomes: 
(2.9) L = ]. 
I can estimate the disequilibrium model defined by equations (2.1) – (2.3) by 
maximizing the likelihood function (2.9) suggested by Maddala and Nelson (1974). I can 
also get the excess demand (or supply) by the difference between the estimated demand 
and supply of the funds. 
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2.1.2.2.3 Estimated Model and Data Set 
Assume that the demand for funds is determined by the interest rate, the economic 
activity, and the inflation rate and that the supply for funds is determined by deposits 
reflecting the capacity to supply funds, the interest rate, and the inflation rate. More 
specifically: 
(2.10) Dt = α0 IMF + α1 + α2 yt + α3 Lt–1 + α4 (CBt – Δpt) 
(2.11) St = β0 IMF + β1 + β2 Lt–1 + β3 DPt + β4 (lrt – Δpt) 
, where IMF is a dummy variable that accounts for the foreign currency crisis in 1998, yt 
denotes the nominal GDP in year t, Lt denotes the balance of the bank loan at the end of 
year t, CBt denotes the rate of return for corporate bonds in year t, Δpt denotes the rate of 
change of the GDP deflator in year t, DPt denotes the balance of bank deposits at the end 
of year t, and lrt denotes the interest rate for the loan in year t. 
The sample period is the years 1987 to 2004. All values of variables, except the 
interest rate and the GDP deflator, are used after taking natural logarithms. 
2.1.2.2.4 Empirical Results 
Table 9 shows the empirical results for the nation as a whole. The demand for 
funds decreases as the real rate of return for corporate bonds, CBt – Δpt, increases, while 
it increases as economic activities, represented by yt, increase. The supply of funds is not 
sensitive to changes in the real interest, lrt – Δpt, and it increases as the balance of bank 
deposits increases.  
Table 10 shows the empirical results of the same model for the capital and its 
neighbors, the Seoul region. Note that the magnitudes of the coefficients are different 
from those for the whole nation. 
 16 
 
Figure 4 shows the amount of estimated oversupply of funds for the nation as a 
whole and for the Seoul region. The lower line from the start is for the nation, and the 
upper line is for the Seoul region. 
Korean loan markets by banks, as a whole, show excess demand before the year 
of 1997, when the Korean economy suffered the foreign currency crisis and the excess 
supply that existed after that time. More specifically, at the beginning of 1990, there was 
a kind of equilibrium between the supply and demand for funds, after which there was 
huge excess demand between 1993 and 1998, when the foreign currency crisis happened. 
After this crisis time, there was huge excess supply and, then, recently, the supply and 
demand became similar. 
It is interesting to note that the situation for the Seoul region shows the opposite 
patterns. That is, the loan markets in the Seoul region show excess supply before the 
foreign currency crisis and excess demand after that time. 
2.1.2.2.5 Implication 
If there is excess demand and, thus, credit rationing, the poor are usually in an 
inferior situation to get funds, because they cannot offer enough collateral for their loans, 
and they need the money for more urgent purposes. Although the Korean loan markets, as 
a whole, recently show excess supply, there is excess demand for funds in the center of 
Korea, Seoul and its adjacent area. This is because the real economy of the capital city 
grows rapidly, and this results in many promising microcredit project items in this area. 
This is the reason why Seoul and its adjacent area should be the main target region of 
microfinance in Korea. 
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2.2 The Present State of Microfinance in Korea 
2.2.1 Why are MFIs so late to start? 
The history of the Microfinance in Korea is less than 10 years, whereas 
microfinance was introduced in Bangladesh in the mid 1970s and then it spread through 
the world.  In this section, I briefly discuss why the Microfinance start so late in Korea.  
First, Korea chose different approaches to reduce poverty; Saemaul Undong 
which mainly focused on an agricultural development project, and labor intensive 
industrialization from 1970 ~ 1985. The Korean government led these policies and 
offered a lot of incentives for private sectors to encourage these policy directions. These 
policies enabled remarkable and steady economic growth since it was introduced. Poverty 
has been continuously reduced as a result. At that time, the whole society, including 
NGOs and academic world, were supportive and cooperative in these policies. The major 
concern in society was how to organize the Saemaul Undong so that it carried out 
efficiently and bore fruit quickly. Therefore, the society doesn’t feel any need to consider 
the microfinance as another alternative to reduce the poverty.  
Although the distribution of income became unfair and favored for the rich in the 
process of the economic development, the unfairness of income distribution was not 
severe enough to hinder people from keeping cooperative attitude toward the economic 
development. Recently the distribution of income significantly favored the wealth and the 
relative ratio of the poor in population drastically increased. This trend was decisively 
exacerbated by the foreign currency crisis in 1997. The income concentration was 
regarded as an impediment to the unity of society and thus the idea that the society need 
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to take care about the poor formed social consensus. As a result, government circles as 
well as the whole society recently showed a fierce interest in microfinance as a tool for 
fight against poverty. 
Another reason why the Microfinance start so late in Korea is that there were 
several other financial systems with similar role as microfinance and these systems 
worked normally until recently. For example, “gye” has been a kind of traditional private 
fund popular among Koreans, whose members chip in a modest amount of money and 
take turns to receive a lump sum share. Savings banks and mutual financial institutions 
carried out loans with a small amount of money (usually less than $ 5,000). These loans 
have several something in common with microfinance; they don’t require collateral and 
they are mostly used by the poor. But they have several different aspects from 
microcredit. These loans are carried out to make a profit. Thus there is no restriction with 
respect to users or the use of money. The interest rate charged for this loan was usually 
much higher than the market level, because no collateral is required. 
However, in the restructuring process after the foreign currency crises, many 
financial companies, whose fiscal stability and profitability is poor, should be excluded 
from the market. It is needless to say that many savings banks and mutual financial 
institutions with these loans no longer survived, as the individuals with loans lost the 
ability to repay their loans and they don’t have any collateral to cover the losses.  
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2.2.2 The Present State of Microfinance in Korea 
Microfinance in Korea does not have a long history. Although MFI has roots in 
the Joyful Union (JOU) in 2000, concerns and interests of the government and the public 
bore fruit with the establishment of the Microfinance Foundation (MIF) in 2008. 
MFIs are mainly located in the Seoul region, and they target people in urban areas. 
Microfinance does not carry out microsaving, which makes the source of funds unstable. 
So far, MFIs mainly provide microcredit that helps the poor start up businesses by 
lending them small amounts of money. Recently, microfinance developed into the current 
situation where one major commercial bank commenced the microcredit project and the 
coverage of microfinance expanded into microinsurance. 
2.2.2.1 The Current MFIs in Korea 
Besides the JOU and the MIF, the Social Solidarity Bank (SSB) and the Beautiful 
World Fund (BWF) are representative MFIs, and they managed approximately $40 
million in October 2008. Below, I explain the current status of microfinance in Korea, 
which is mainly focused on the terms of microcredit and the structure and behavior of 
these MFIs. 
2.2.2.1.1 The Microfinance Foundation 
The MIF was established as a public foundation in March 2008, based on the Law 
of Establishment of the Microfinance Foundation, which was enacted to regulate the 
establishment and operating procedures of the MIF in August 2007. The main funding 
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sources of MIFs are the deposits in dormant accounts in banks and insurance companies, 
which are assessed around $0.2 billion. 
The major projects of the MIF are as follows, (1) microcredit to help the poor to 
start new businesses or to get new jobs; (2) microinsurance to support the poor to make 
contracts and to maintain basic insurance; and (3) public welfare projects to relieve the 
burden of the expenses of tuition and medical services for the children of low-income 
families. The actual projects are conducted by different financial institutions that the MIF 
designates as agents and whose behavior it controls on those projects. The MIF started 
microcredit and public welfare projects right after it was established, but it started 
microinsurance only recently, which I explain later in more detail. To carry out these 
projects, the MIF has around 20 staff, but the main decisions are made by the governing 
body, which is composed of 11 members from both the public and private sectors. 
Beneficial outcomes from the recent establishment of the MIF are yet to be 
revealed, but its establishment has made the Korean people take more interest in 
microfinance. 
2.2.2.1.2 The Social Solidarity Bank 
The Social Solidarity Bank (SSB) is a nongovernment organization (NGO) that 
was established in December 2002 to aid poor people who were running, or planning to 
start, a microenterprise. The SSB provides seed money for low-income families without 
collateral and provides assistance in the form of training in management and marketing 
skills for their continuous growth. Sponsored by the Samsung Group and the Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Families, the SSB manages funds of around $8 million with 28 staff. 
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Since its establishment, the SSB had advanced $6 million to 352 persons by 
September 2006, which is the largest amount among MFIs in Korea. In terms of business 
scope, the largest portion of the credit was used for the start-up of businesses. If 
differentiated with respect to business types, the service sector (37%) is ranked first, 
followed by the food sector (31%), the wholesale/retail sector (21%), the manufacturing 
sector (10%) and agriculture (1%). 
Each person can get, at most, $20,000 in a loan over four years with an annual 
interest rate of between 0% and 6%. Repayments are over equal installments for 42 
months after a six-month period of deferment. The repayment rate has been relatively 
high, namely 90% by September 2006. The approval of loans usually takes three to four 
weeks, during which time the SSB inspects basic documents and checks the proposed 
businesses, the repayment ability of the applicants and their basic skills. 
2.2.2.1.3 The Joyful Union 
The JOU was established in June 2000 to help the poor who could not provide the 
collateral for loans and, thus, by giving them seed money, enabled them to start up their 
businesses. The JOU manages funds of about $1.5 million, sponsored by the City Group, 
the Munwha Broadcasting Corporation (one of the major broadcasting companies) and 
donations from many individuals, with 18 staff and volunteers. 
The JOU targets communities in rural areas, especially the low-income group, 
which makes it different from the other MFIs. Since its establishment, the JOU has 
advanced loans totaling $1 million to 73 communities by July 2007. 
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The maximum loan is $50,000 per community, with an annual interest rate 
between 2% and 4%. Repayments are by one of two options: weekly base repayments 
over 200 weeks; or monthly base repayments of equal installments over four years after a 
one-year period of deferment. The repayment rate has been very high, namely 96% up to 
July 2006. The approval of loans is based on inspecting basic documents, checking the 
place of business and interviewing. This process usually takes around 60 days. 
2.2.2.1.4 The Beautiful World Fund 
The Beautiful World Fund (BWF) was established to support the start-up of 
businesses, especially for families without male heads. Actually, the BWF is one of the 
funds in the Beautiful Foundation, whose main purpose is to help the poor in various 
ways. Based on the bequest of an owner of a conglomerate, this foundation has funds of 
$1.4 million, and the BWF supports microcredit projects using the gains from its funds. 
Since its establishment, the BWF has approved 15 loans amounting to $4.7 
million, most loans being to help families without male heads to start new businesses in 
Seoul. 
The basic features of the BWF loans are that $30,000 is the maximum amount, 
and they have a seven-year maturity with a 1% annual interest rate. Repayments of the 
loans are by equal installments each month. The repayment rate has been very high (90.9% 
of loans). The approvals of loans usually take six months and are based on inspections. 
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2.2.2.2 Recent Phenomena in Microfinance 
In this section, I will explain two unprecedented phenomena in microfinance in 
Korea; namely, commercial banks participating in microcredit, and the MFIs starting to 
offer microinsurance. 
2.2.2.2.1 Participation of Commercial Banks in Microcredit 
As the volume of microcredit has become bigger and people have taken an 
interest in microfinance, the Hana Bank, which is ranked fifth among commercial banks 
in terms of magnitude of assets in Korea, announced that it was going to participate in 
microcredit for profit. Compared with other MFIs, its scheme is more aggressive and 
expansive. The Hana Bank gives not only microcredit loans which can be used for 
starting up businesses but also additional synthetic business consulting to help 
microcredit users survive in the long term. For this reason, the amount of loans is larger, 
being in the range of $50,000 to $300,000 per person. 
2.2.2.2.2 Commencement of Microinsurance 
Another recent phenomenon in microfinance is that microinsurance has emerged 
in the market. In December 2008, the MIF and insurance companies decided to provide 
microinsurance, after long discussions among task force members from the public and 
private sectors. 
Normally, contractors can get benefits between $5,000 and $10,000 with 
microinsurance premiums less than $180, in case of death, casualty or hospitalization. 
Contractors who are low-income families do not need to pay the whole premium but are 
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required to pay only 5%, while the MIF pays the remainder. In this sense, this 
microinsurance project is expected to play an important role as a social safety net. 
2.3 The Use of Financial markets by the Poor 
In the first section, I explained credit rationing in the bank loan markets. Now I 
discuss how credit is rationed for the poor by closely investigating the use of financial 
markets in Korea by the poor. 
2.3.1 Who are the unbanked? 
The formal financial institutions whose main targets are the poor people in Korea 
are savings banks, credit unions, and community credit cooperatives. As is clear from 
table 11, about 42.3% of the total number of these institutions disappeared from the 
market through the restructuring process after the foreign currency crisis in 1997. This 
implies that the use of formal institutions by the poor decreased very sharply, even for the 
poor with adequate collateral. 
Furthermore, the poor usually obtain smaller levels of credit because of low 
income, insufficient wealth, and inability to offer adequate collateral for loans. According 
to the report by the Ministry of Finance and Economy distributed on Dec. 12, 2006, about 
16.6% of the total users of financial services, or 5.6 million people, have credit range 8 to 
10, implying that they cannot use the normal financial institutions (see figure 5 for 
details). 
Included among those who have been excluded from the normal financial services 
are those who failed to fulfill their financial obligations and thus were listed as bad 
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debtors, and the number of those is estimated to be 2.8 million, which is about 8.2% of 
the total, as of December 2006. 
These people can only use private lending, such as local moneylenders, if they 
need external loans because of their poor credit. The number of local moneylender users 
is estimated to be 3.3 million, based on the investigation in 2006 for all registered local 
moneylenders under the unified governance by the Ministry of Public Administration and 
Security and the Korea Institute of Finance. 
2.3.2 Money Borrowing from the Informal Sectors 
The poor, because of low credit availability, usually depend on informal local 
moneylenders for their urgent loans. Although registration is required to operate as a 
local moneylender, there are still many nonregistered moneylenders. I introduce several 
aspects of local moneylenders, based on the investigation in 2006 for all the registered 
local moneylenders under the unified governance of the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security and the Korea Institute of Finance (referred to here as 
“KIF”). More recently in 2008, another inspection by the Financial Services Commission 
(referred to here as “FSC”) was carried out. I revealed some data in the following section 
and compare the data in 2008 inspection with the data in 2006 inspection. 
2.3.2.1 General State of Local Moneylenders 
The number of moneylenders registered in local government areas is 17,210 in 
2006. The number of moneylenders has shown a steady increase over time. The size of 
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the market for the local moneylenders is conjectured to be $18 billion and the number of 
users is conjectured to be 3.3 million.  
The number of moneylenders registered in local government areas in 2008 is 
almost the same as in 2006. The number of moneylenders has shown a steady increase 
over time until 2006, but it maintained almost the same. The size of the market for the 
local moneylenders is conjectured to be $10 billion and the number of users is 
conjectured to be 1.3 million, which shows a huge decrease from the previous 2006 
inspection. 
2.3.2.2 The Users of Local Moneylender Market 
Among the age groups, the group in their thirties, whose ratio was 36% in the 
survey by the KIF and 50% by the Financial Supervisory Service in 2006 inspection, is 
ranked first and then the group in their twenties. As for occupation, company employees 
have the largest percentage, being between 51% and 61%, and the self-employed are the 
next largest group. 
The survey by the Financial Supervisory Service in 2006 shows that the reason 
for using local moneylenders is the difficulties caused by the current economic situation. 
The inspection in 2008 by FSC shows the same result. 
The users depend on only small amounts of money, based on the survey by the 
KIF in 2006; i.e., 57% of the total borrowers get credits amounting to less than $5,000 
and average amount of loans from local money lenders is around $9,000. The amount of 
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loans from local money lenders decreased in 2008, based on the fact that the average 
amount of loans is around $8,000.  
As for the interest rate charged on credit in 2006, only 27% of total users of 
registered local moneylenders and 14% users of nonregistered—and thus illegal—local 
moneylenders are charged below 66%, which is the maximum interest rate permitted by 
the Korean usury law. More specifically the average interested charged for the loans from 
local money lenders in 2006 is 199% a year. The interest rate charged from local money 
lenders decreased in 2008, based on the fact that the average interest rate charged from 
local money lenders is 72.2% a year. The maximum interest rate permitted by the Korean 
usury law changed to be 49% a year from Aug, 2007. I think this change lowered average 
interest rate charged for the loans, although it was still higher than the maximum interest 
rate permitted by the Korean usury law.  
2.3.2.3 The Percentages of Lending for Each Credit Range 
As conjectured, local moneylenders usually give loans to households with bad 
credit ratings. Among the total credit advanced by local moneylenders in 2006, the 
percentage for households with credit scores between 4 and 7 is 52.2% and that for credit 
scores between 8 and 10 is 44.1%, based on information given by local moneylenders to 
the National Information and Credit Evaluation, which is one of the credit bureaus in 
Korea. The percentage of householders with credit scores between 4 and 7 is 52.2%, but 
that for credit scores between 1 and 3 is just 3.7%. 
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2.3.2.4 Profitability of Local Moneylenders 
Based on the audit reports by an independent audit of 29 moneylenders, the 
overall profitability for moneylenders is good and has been increasing. The net current 
profit for the fiscal year 2006, as a whole, was $2.1 billion, being an increase of 4.5% 
compared with $2.0 billion in 2005. 
2.3.3 Money Lending from the Formal Sectors 
Normal financial institutions that operate money lending for the poor are 
commercial banks, credit finance institutions including credit card companies and mutual 
financial institutions. In the restructuring process after the financial crisis in Korea, many 
financial companies, whose fiscal stability and profitability is poor, should be excluded 
from the market. This means that the financial institutions that survive require strict 
collateral when they give loans to clients. The poor usually cannot offer collateral, and 
they do not have a good credit score either. Thus, financial services for the poor are so 
restricted that they cannot satisfy their needs. In the following sections, I explain these 
phenomena in more detail, based on actual data. 
2.3.3.1 Commercial Banks 
The total credit balances of commercial banks to households increased by 11.1%, 
from $389 billion in June 2005 to $432 billion in March 2007. Most of the loans were 
granted to households with good credit. Among the total loans by March 2007, about 
52.1% of the loans were granted to households with credit scores in the range 1 to 3, and 
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about 42.7% to households with credit scores in the range 4 to 7. However, the 
percentage of households with credit scores in the range 8 to 10 was just 5.2%. 
2.3.3.2 Credit Finance Institutions 
Credit card companies and leasing and installment financing companies are listed 
in the category of credit financial institutions. These institutions do not provide savings 
accounts but only credit services, which make them crucially different from commercial 
banks. 
The total credit balances for households of credit card companies was $6.9 billion 
by March 2007, reflecting the steady decrease from December 2005. The credit balances 
for households with credit scores in the range 8 to 10 showed a remarkable decrease of 
74%, from $6.8 billion in June 2005 to $1.8 billion in March 2006. 
The credit balances of leasing and installment financing companies show the 
same trend; the loan for bad credits shows a steadily decreasing trend. 
2.3.3.3 Savings Banks and Mutual Financial Institutions 
Savings banks in Korea are small consumer banks mainly targeting ordinary 
people and small enterprises. The total credit for households was $12.9 billion in March 
2007 and increased by 3% from $12.6 in June 2005. The percentage of households with 
credit scores in the range 8 to 10 was 51% in March 2007, which is the highest ratio 
among formal financial institutions. Recently, the percentage of households with credit 
rating in the bad credit range decreased because of the steady increase in the percentage 
of loans to households with good credit ratings. 
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The credit for the households from the mutual financial institutions, including 
credit unions, mainly targets households with good credit; the largest percentage of the 
credit was allotted to households with credit scores in the credit range 4 to 7, namely 
66.6%. Loans for households with credit scores in the bad credit range increased steadily. 
2.4 Review of the Existing Microfinance Institutions in Korea 
In this section, I review and assess the impact of microfinance in Korea. The 
assessment mainly focuses on the SSB, which is one of the major MFIs. 
2.4.1 More Details on Funds and Repayments 
The SSB has done well in getting funds to support the microenterprises and 
managing the repayments for the last five years after it undertook these projects in 2003. 
The SSB is now one of the major MFIs supporting microenterprises in the private sector. 
The funds of the SSB were $2.5 million, as of 2005, accounting for 6.6% of the 
total funds for supporting the start-up of businesses. If I exclude public funds, then 78% 
of the remaining funds were allotted to the SSB, which is the largest percentage to any 
MFI, the next most important being the JOU. 
The amount of funds and the number of microenterprises and beneficiaries of the 
SSB show steady growth patterns for the last five years. The amount of funds used to 
help start businesses increased from $23,000 in 2003 to $3.3 million in 2007. The number 
of microenterprises increased from 10 in 2003 to 165 in 2007, while the number of 
beneficiaries increased from 36 in 2003 to 262 in 2007. (See figure 6 for details.) 
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I now consider the sources of funds to the SSB from 2003 to July 2007. The total 
amount of funds for these four years was $9.4 million, of which the central government 
contributed 47.2%, and the rest was from the private sector. Of the government’s 
contribution, 16.8% ($1.5 million) was from the Ministry for Females and Families; 30.9% 
($2.9 million) was from the Ministry of Health and Welfare; 38.9% ($3.7 million) was 
from financial companies; and 13.4% ($1.3 million) was from general companies. The 
sources of the funds make impacts on the role of the SSB. As for the funds that the SSB 
collects by itself, the SSB carries out the whole business procedure, including choosing 
the targets, giving the loans, managing repayments, and several other services after the 
loans are approved. The funds help to self-support the communities from the Ministry for 
Females and Families and to help sexually harassed women to start new businesses with 
support from the Ministry of Health and Welfare. These ministries provide a total of 47.2% 
of the total funds of the SSB. The other 11.6% of the total is assigned to management and 
administration of the SSB, while other procedures are carried out by several financial 
companies. 
Table 12 shows the status of repayments for the period from 2003 to July 2007. 
Among the 479 enterprises that got loans for these five years, 85% succeeded in repaying 
without any problems. Only 0.6% of the loans defaulted. Thus, the maximum repayment 
rate could rise to 99.6% if the enterprises that the SSB tried to get repayment succeeded 
in repaying. In this sense, it is crucially important to encourage these enterprises to make 
smooth repayments to achieve stable sources for microcredit and to ensure financial 
sustainability. 
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2.4.2 Assessment of the Procedure in Microcredit 
The SSB can get funds from both the government and the private sector, because 
it is widely accepted that the SSB has better project schemes than the other MFIs for 
microcredit projects, including such procedures as choosing the targets, approving loans, 
managing repayments and providing several services later. To check whether the SSB’s 
microcredit projects have produced good results, I conducted some synthetic analysis 
using the documents from the SSB survey of the 345 microenterprises that were in 
operation in December 2007. Interviews were conducted with 12 relationship managers 
(RMs) who delivered services to the targeted enterprises from the first stage to the end of 
the repayments. 
2.4.2.1 General Comparison with Other Projects 
The SSB’s services for start-up businesses have some differences from other 
services from the public sector, including a loan project from an occupation fund by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, a loan project for store lease by the Korea Workers’ 
Compensation and Welfare Service, and a support project for small and medium 
businesses by the Small and Medium Business Administration. Clients who do not have 
collateral or cosigners but who have willingness to self-support and good business sense 
may be able to get loans, but they may need collateral and/or cosigners for some projects. 
In addition to the basic documents on which other agents depend heavily when 
considering loan applications, the SSB carries out strict on-the-spot surveys and 
interviews, through which it finds the most promising targets with a high probability of 
repayments being made. 
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The SSB makes it mandatory for loan applicants to get necessary training from 
appropriate specialists as a package program, so that they get useful guidance on starting 
up businesses. 
Other institutions have standardized rules concerning the amounts and conditions 
of loans, and the repayments are managed by normal non-specialist staff or by the bank. 
However, with the SSB’s microcredit, the amount and the conditions are flexible 
depending on the economic situations of the clients, and the repayments are managed by 
specialists, RMs. These features contribute to high repayment rates for SSB loans. The 
RMs fully charge for the services provided after loans are approved by the SSB, which 
contribute to high survival rates of the target enterprises. 
2.4.2.2 Choice of the Target 
The target is the fragile class such as the poor and those excluded from financial 
services. Among these, those with a high willingness to self-support, preparations for the 
commencement of business, and business acumen or ability will be finally chosen, so that 
the probability of success will be increased. 
The loan approval procedure is strict and well organized. In inspecting basic 
documents, administrative staff checks the economic conditions of the families involved, 
the business programs, business experience, etc. The actual on-the-spot inspections that 
are done by the RMs mainly focus on business conditions and the credibility of the 
applicants, etc., which cannot usually be assessed without personal interviews. Before 
choosing the target, the final interview is done by outside specialists. 
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Some applicants may feel uncomfortable with the strict procedure, but the 
majorities are satisfied by the specialists and the commitment to duty of the SSB 
members. By letting the RMs be involved in choosing the target, they establish good 
relationships from the first stage of business, and this contributes to finding targets with 
high probabilities of success. 
2.4.2.3 Education for Start-up Businesses 
The education of clients of the SSB for start-up businesses is done for a total of 18 
hours over three days. The education is done in the form of lectures by outside specialists, 
who are to convey the basic information intensively in a short period. 
The contents of this education are mainly practical business knowledge: the 
business program and the selection of business locations (the time allotted is four hours), 
marketing skill (four hours), accounting and finance (3.5 hours), and customer service 
(four hours). 
This education may not be fully effective and may not satisfy the needs of the 
customers because it is in lecture form and is theory oriented. 
2.4.2.4 Money Support 
The amounts and conditions of the loans are flexible. For the amount of loans, the 
median (average) is $15,000 ($20,000), but there is a wide range from $1,500 to 
$150,000, depending on the economic situation of the applicants. The interest rates vary 
widely, ranging from 0% to 6% per annum, which can be adjusted depending on the 
needs and situations of the applicants. 
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The management of the repayments is carried out by the RMs, who decide the 
frequency of client visits to check their economic situation and to handle repayment 
negotiations, if needed, depending on the applicant’s credit rating. Sometimes, a subsidy 
is given, as an incentive, to clients who have a good repayment history. 
For users of this service, the money borrowed from the SSB is very helpful to 
start up a business. Sometimes, the RMs think that the flexibility of loans should be 
increased so that additional funds are extended for emergencies, depending on the 
economic situation. Such options help clients to cope with difficult situations. 
2.4.2.5 Services after Loans 
The RMs, who are specialists for the services provided after loans are approved, 
have a close connection with the clients so that they can provide guidance in business 
management and moral support in times of need. The moral support is provided through 
regular consultations. The guidance in business management covers such things as: (1) 
guidance before the start-up: store locations, selection of items, and assessment of the 
commercial environment; (2) guidance for start-up activities: choice of menus, opening 
ceremonies of stores, and the design of stationery and signage; and (3) guidance for 
management skill: checking the outputs, how to increase productivity, and strategies for 
customer service. 
These services are provided during regular visits, which are at least twice a month, 
and by phone consultation. The outside specialists can be involved if the RMs think this 
is needed. 
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The service users revealed very high satisfaction with respect to the expertise and 
sense of duty of the RMs, and they think that this service is very helpful for the start-up 
and managing of businesses. 
However, the number of the RMs is not sufficient for them to cover numerous 
enterprises, and they may be unfamiliar with the operation of some business types. This 
may result in some inefficiency in providing the benefits of the RMs to the clients. 
2.5 Conclusion 
I suggested that recent phenomena of income polarization and credit rationing in 
the financial market are evidence that microfinance is needed in Korea. Although the 
Korean economy has made great strides, the difference in the income between the poor 
and the rich has gotten much greater. The foreign currency crisis in 1997 deepened 
income polarization and the impact is continuing. Banks choose to ration credit instead of 
increasing interest rate (when there was an excess demand for loans) which would lead 
adverse selection and moral hazards. The poor are in an inferior position when it comes 
to getting funds when credit ration happens because they cannot offer collateral and they 
need money urgently. 
This chapter reviewed and assessed the impact of microfinance in Korea. This 
chapter also explained the Use of Financial markets by the Poor. These inspections, 
together with further methods which will be explained in later chapters, will be used as 
backgrounds for future plans for the development of microfinance in Korea. 
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Table 1. Incidence of Poverty in Korea 
(Unit: %) 
 1965 1970 1976 1980 1991 
Urban Households 54.9 16.2 18.1 10.4 8.7 
Rural Households 35.8 27.9 11.7 9.0 2.8 
All Households 40.9 23.4 14.8 9.8 7.6 
 
Sources: Suh (1985) and Hyun and Na (1993). 
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Table 2. Reduction in Poverty 
Percent Changes in Reduction in Number 
of Poor between 1970 & 1990 
Absolute Poverty (% of pop.)* 
 (%) (mil.) 1970 1980 1990 
China 64 175 33 (97) 28 (96) 9 (95) 
Indonesia 61 43 69 (82) 29 (80) 15 (66) 
Korea 71 5 23 (84) 10 (37) 5 (20)** 
Malaysia 80 1.6 18 (85) 9 (85) 2 (85) 
Philippines 0 0 35 (85) 30 (75) 24 (77) 
Thailand 5 0.5 26 (94) 17 (94) 16 (94) 
East Asia 60 225 204 (93) 123 (92) 71 (87) 
 
Note: * Figures in parenthesis are percentage of the poor in rural areas. 
         ** For 1985. 
Sources: Johansen (1993), and World Bank, Social Indicators of Development, 1994. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
 
Table 3. Trends in the Absolute Poverty Rate of Households in Korea 
(Unit: %) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
23.91 23.78 21.93 16.80 16.92 18.30 16.08 
 
Sources: Korea Labor Institute, KLIPS 
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Table 4. The Experiencing Poverty Depending on Features of Households 
(Unit: %) 
 Experience of 
Poverty 
Number of Years in which the Subjects were Below 
the Poverty Line 
No Yes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Total 54.6 45.4 14.0 8.5 6.1 4.1 3.4 3.4 5.9 
 100.0 30.8 18.7 13.4 9.1 7.5 7.5 13.0 
Sex Male 58.7 41.3 35.9 19.6 13.9 9.1 7.0 5.7 8.7 
Female 26.6 73.4 11.4 14.9 11.4 9.0 9.5 14.
4 
29.4 
 
 
Age 
20s 79.3 20.7 31.6 36.8 10.5 5.3 5.3 10.
5 
0.0 
30s 69.1 30.9 43.8 25.5 10.9 7.8 2.6 3.6 5.7 
40s 61.6 38.4 45.7 17.1 14.7 8.2 7.3 2.4 4.5 
50s 53.0 47.0 34.2 28.5 12.7 5.7 10.8 2.5 5.7 
60s ~ 21.1 78.9 12.1 10.7 14.3 12.1 9.0 15.
2 
26.7 
Edu-
cation 
Level 
Below High 
school 
46.8 53.2 28.7 18.8 13.5 8.9 7.9 8.3 13.9 
Above 
College 
83.6 16.4 52.9 15.7 14.3 11.4 2.9 0.0 2.9 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
 (Unit: %) 
 Experience of 
Poverty 
Number of Years in which the Subjects were Below 
the Poverty Line 
No Yes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Eco- 
nomic 
Acti- 
vity 
Regular 79.0 21.0 47.4 22.5 12.1 8.1 3.5 2.9 3.5 
Tempo- 
rary 
58.8 41.2 19.0 33.3 9.5 14.3 9.5 4.8 9.5 
Daily 41.6 58.4 25.8 21.2 12.1 10.6 9.1 3.0 18.2 
No Salary 50.6 49.4 39.1 20.2 12.7 8.1 7.2 5.5 7.2 
Un-emp 
loyed 
31.3 68.7 35.0 22.3 15.5 6.8 11.7 4.9 3.9 
Not entering 
a profession 
21.0 79.0 13.4 12.1 14.8 10.4 8.1 14.4 26.8 
House
hold 
Type 
Only 
married 
couple 
32.1 67.9 15.2 16.3 15.7 11.8 9.6 11.2 20.2 
Parents & 
Kid(s) 
65.3 34.7 44.3 21.5 12.9 7.9 5.9 3.4 4.1 
Single 
Parent & 
Kid(s) 
37.4 62.6 23.6 12.5 19.4 13.9 8.3 6.9 15.3 
One man 33.0 67.0 10.9 16.4 4.7 6.3 9.4 19.5 32.8 
Extended 
Family 
49.2 50.8 30.0 18.0 16.7 9.3 8.0 5.3 12.7 
 
Sources: Korea Labor Institute, KLIPS 
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Table 5. Transition Probability of Economic Activity Status 
(Unit: %) 
                          t+1 year 
    t  year 
Employed Unemployed Not entering 
a profession 
Total 
 
The Poor 
 
Employed 88.8 4.2 7.0 100.0 
Unemployed 62.3 11.5 26.2 100.0 
Not entering 
a profession 
23.0 4.0 73.0 100.0 
 
Non Poor 
Employed 96.2 1.1 2.7 100.0 
Unemployed 74.3 11.0 14.7 100.0 
Not entering 
a profession 
29.4 3.1 67.5 100.0 
Sources: Korea Labor Institute, KLIPS 
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Table 6. Transition Probability of Economic Activity Status of the Employed 
(Unit: %) 
           t+1 year
t year 
Regu
lar 
Tempo
rary 
Daily No Pay Unempl
oyed 
Not entering 
a profession 
Total 
The 
Poor 
Regular 80.4 1.8 1.8 5.4 3.6 7.1 100.0 
Tempo 
rary 
3.9 50.0 15.4 7.7 7.7 15.4 100.0 
Daily 4.0 2.0 79.8 2.0 4.0 8.1 100.0 
No Pay 5.4 0.7 4.0 81.2 4.0 4.7 100.0 
Non 
Poor 
Regular 91.8 0.9 0.7 3.1 1.3 2.2 100.0 
Tempo 
rary 
20.0 56.2 6.0 6.0 2.6 9.4 100.0 
Daily 7.5 2.8 79.2 4.3 1.3 5.1 100.0 
No pay 3.4 0.7 1.1 91.9 0.6 2.4 100.0 
 
Sources: Korea Labor Institute, KLIPS 
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Table 7. The Transition Probability of the Level of Household Wealth 
(Unit: %) 
                          t+1 year 
    t  year 
Poor Less Poor Non Poor Total 
Poor 46.8 12.6 40.6 100.0 
Less Poor 19.9 17.7 62.4 100.0 
Non Poor 5.6 4.1 90.3 100.0 
 
Sources: Korea Labor Institute, KLIPS 
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Table 8. Distribution of Non-Poverty and Continuous Poverty Depending on 
Features of Households 
(Unit: %) 
 Non Poor Experience 
Once 
Continuously 
Poor 
Total 
Sex Male 93.8 92.3 53.2 87.2 
Female 6.3 7.7 46.8 12.8 
 
 
Age 
20s 6.3 2.0 0.0 4.3 
30s 36.7 28.1 8.7 29.0 
40s 33.6 37.5 8.7 29.8 
50s 15.2 18.1 7.1 15.7 
60s ~ 8.1 14.4 75.4 21.1 
Education 
Level 
High School 
Diploma or 
Below 
69.4 87.6 98.4 80.0 
BA Degree 
or Above 
30.6 12.4 1.6 20.0 
Economic 
Activity 
Regular 55.7 27.4 4.8 38.5 
Temporary 2.6 1.3 1.6 2.4 
Daily 4.0 5.7 9.5 5.3 
No Salary 26.9 40.1 17.5 29.1 
Unemployed 4.0 12.0 3.2 7.0 
Not entering 
a profession 
6.8 13.4 63.5 17.7 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
(Unit: %) 
 Non Poor Experience 
Once 
Continuously 
Poor 
Total 
Household 
Type 
Only married 
couple 
7.2 9.0 28.6 12.3 
Parents & 
Kid(s) 
71.3 65.6 14.3 59.6 
Single Parent 
& Kid(s) 
3.7 5.7 8.7 5.4 
One Person 5.4 4.7 33.3 8.9 
Extended 
Family 
12.4 15.1 15.1 13.8 
 
Sources: Korea Labor Institute, KLIPS 
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Table 9. Estimation Result for the Nation 
α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 likelihood
-0.109 
(0.187) 
-4.519** 
(1.873) 
1.287*** 
(0.401) 
0.038 
(0.339) 
-0.038* 
(0.020) 
38.795 β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 
0.018 
(1.091) 
-0.388 
(0.335) 
-0.000 
(0.275) 
1.302*** 
(0.256) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * (**, ***) significant at the 10-percent (5-
percent, 1-percent) level. 
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Table 10.  Estimation Result for Seoul Region 
α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 likelihood
0.739** 
(0.293) 
-3.546** 
(1.542) 
0.976*** 
(0.256) 
0.008 
(0.293) 
-0.008* 
(0.006) 
35.049 β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 
-1.134 
(23.185) 
-2.825 
(23.063) 
-0.018 
(0.151) 
1.309*** 
(0.222) 
0.018 
(0.025) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * (**, ***) significant at the 10-percent (5-
percent, 1-percent) level. 
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Table 11.  Financial Institutions Restructuring (Nov. 97 ~ Mar. 07) 
(Unit ; %) 
classifi
cation 
Total 
number 
Restructuring 
establi 
shment 
Current 
Number 
Decerti 
fycation 
mer 
ger 
Bank 
ruptcy 
contract 
transfer
Sub 
total 
(B) 
Ratio 
(B/A)
Saving 
bank 
231 108 28 1 137 59.3 16 110 
Credit 
union 
1,666 2 125 534 661 39.7 15 1,020 
Credit 
coopera
tive 
2,743 - - - 1,164 42.4 - 1,579 
  
Source: the Ministry of Finance and Economy  
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Table 12.  Current State of Repayment of Fund 
(unit: % (number)) 
Current status On operation Quit / Give up Number of enterprises Payment ratio
Total 100 (377) 100 (102) 100 (479)  
Finish repayment 31.6 (119) 32.4 (33) 31.7 (152)  
Managing by Bank 12.5 (47) - 9.8 (47)  
Unredeemable 19.1 (72) - 15.0 (72)  
Repaying 35.5 (134) 4.3 (2) 28.4 (136) 85.0 % 
Encouraging 1.1 (4) 63.7 (65) 14.4 (69) 99.6 % 
No repayment 0.3 (1) 2.0 (2) 0.6 (3) 0.6 % 
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Figure 1. Trend in the percentages of different income classes 
 
 
    
Source: Korea National Statistical office 
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Figure 2. Trend in Indexes for Measuring the Inequality in Income Distribution 
 
Source: Korea National Statistical office 
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Figure 3.  Trend in the Poverty Ratio 
 
   Source: Korea National Statistical office 
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Figure 4.  Estimated Oversupply of Fund 
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Figure 5. Classification of Financial Institutions available depending on Credit 
Range 
 
Source: the Ministry of Finance and Economy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit Range  Number (Portion) Financial Institutions available
    
1 ~ 6  26.9 million (78.8%) General Commercial Banks 
    
1 ~ 7  28.4 million (83.4%) Small-size Financial Institution
    
8 ~ 10  5.6 million (16.6%) 
Private Money Lending 
including Local Money Lender
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Figure 6.  The Transition of Fund and the number of Microenterprises 
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Chapter 3 
 
An Exploratory Study of the Survival of Microenterprises 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Microfinance has played a key role in helping poor people out of poverty in the 
past 25 years. There is widespread enthusiasm around the world for microfinance. Korea 
is not an exception. Recently government circles as well as the academic world have 
shown a fierce interest in microfinance. For microfinance to function in helping 
microenterprises, microenterprises must get a good start and there must be helpful 
services to maintain them. From the experience of other countries which have long 
history in microfinance, we expect that microenterprises can enjoy increased profits once 
they succeed. Table 13 shows the expected profit rates for microenterprises in 
Bangladesh. 
In this sense finding the reasons why microenterprises succeed and analyzing how 
to maintain their good performance are essential elements in planning a successful future 
for microenterprises. Unfortunately there has not been enough investigation of these 
issues in Korea, because the history of microfinance, in practice as well as in theory, is 
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still young2. Taking this fact into account, this chapter attempts to discover those sources 
which have had an impact on the outcome of microenterprises and examines what makes 
for consistently successful outcomes. Two econometric methods (the logit regression 
model and the Cox proportional hazard model) are used in this investigation in order to 
provide some robustness to the results. 
I chose the survival ratio as the proxy for the outcome of microenterprises. By 
microenterprise survival I mean that a microenterprise was still in operation at the end of 
the target period, which was set to be July 2007, the end period for the data set used in 
this model. There are two reasons why I chose survival as the proxy for the outcome of 
microenterprises. The first reason is that it is really difficult to gather reliable financial 
data on the outcomes of microenterprises, such as total sales and net sales. Since 
microenterprises with microcredit from MFIs are scattered throughout Korea and 
evaluating systems for their performance are not developed, even MFIs do not have exact 
information about the economic outcomes of their clients.  
Another reason why I chose the survival ratio as the proxy for the outcome is that 
the economic outcome of the microenterprises does not reflect the true outcome of 
microcredit lending. The history of microcredit is very short and the coverage that 
microcredit has provided has been limited 3 . Thus the current economic status of 
                                                 
2  The first microfinance institution in Korea, the Joyful-Union, was established in 2000. 
Microfinance in Korea is therefore less than 10 years old. 
3 The number of individuals who have been excluded from official financial services is estimated 
to have been 2.8 million, 8.2% of the total, as of December 2006 and the number of those who 
received microcredit as of July 2007 was just 430. 
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microfinance does not reveal the potential economic value of microenterprises as a whole 
in the long run. By choosing microenterprise survival as the variable of interest, we can 
learn lessons from what has occurred and use these results to plan for the future.  
Using data on the survival of microenterprises, I want to check the impact of 
several business characteristics, such as organizational form, sex of the owner(s), income 
level of the owner(s), and type of business on the survival of microenterprises. By 
implementing econometric methods, I tested whether or not these factors have an impact 
on the survival of microenterprises, in which direction they impacted them, and the 
relative magnitudes of the impacts of the above features (e.g. the difference between male 
and female, etc.).  
3.2 Data Set 
For this analysis, the data as of July 2007 from all the microenterprises which 
received microcredit from SSB, a major microfinance institution, was used. The number 
of microenterprises which received microcredit is 430. Each microenterprise data set 
contains information concerning the organizational form, the sex of the owner(s), the 
income level of the owner(s), the type of business, and whether or not the business is still 
operational. 
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3.3 Logit Regression Model  
Logit regression 4  is a generalized linear model for binomial regression. It is 
usually used to predict the probability of occurrence of an event. I want to find the effects 
of microenterprise characteristics on the survival rates of microenterprises after start-up 
using a logit regression model. The characteristics that were chosen as possible factors 
affecting the survival ratio of microenterprises were organizational form, sex of the 
owner(s), income level of the owner(s), and type of business. Each of these is defined in 
more detail below. 
3.3.1 Definition of Variables 
The dependent variable in the model is the probability of survival. By 
microenterprise survival I mean a microenterprise was still in operation at the end of the 
target period, which was set to be July 2007, the end period for the data set used in this 
model. The survival status of an enterprise was represented by a binary variable “Live”; 
the values for the live variable was either 1 if the microenterprise survive through the 
target period or 0 if the microenterprise failed to survive (or quit). Thus we can denote 
the probability of survival with a short notation like Prob (Live = 1), where Prob ( · ) 
stands for the probability of something ( · ). 
                                                 
4  Logit regression is used with binary data when you want to model the probability that a 
specified outcome will occur. Specifically, it is aimed at estimating parameters a and b in the 
following model: Li ൌ log
୮୧
ଵି୮୧
 = a + b xi, where pi is the probability of a success for given value 
xi of the explanatory variable X. Use of the log of the odds p/(1-p) (the logit) guarantees that the 
predicted value of p will always be between 0 and 1.  
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Each microenterprise is defined by its organizational form, sex of the owner(s), 
income level of the owner(s), and type of business and the variation of these 
characteristics is taken to define the independent variables for this model. 
It would be nice to have a continuous variable for the income level of the 
owner(s), but the data is not available. Due to the limitation of data, all independent 
variables are categorical5. Thus I need to convert categorical variables into numerical 
representations using dummy variables. To do this, I chose a subcategory in each variable 
as the reference. The reference category is coded 0 on all dummy variables. 
The variable “organizational form” reflects the effective ownership form of each 
enterprise. That is, organization form is either sole proprietorship or joint venture. The 
reference category is the joint venture. 
 The variable “sex” represents the sex of the owner(s). Enterprises are divided into 
three groups: male, female, and joint (for ventures which have two owners, one male and 
one female). The reference is the joint category. 
The variable “income level” stands for the income level of the owner(s) of a 
microenterprise. This variable is divided into four subcategories: poorest, poor, general, 
and mixture. Those in the poorest have income below the minimum cost of living6, those 
                                                 
5 A set of data is said to be categorical if the values or observations belonging to it can be sorted 
according to category.  
6 The minimum cost of living varies according to the number of household. The minimum cost 
of living in 2009 for the households with one member is $ 490/month, with 2 members $ 830, 
with 3 members $ 1,000, and with 4 members $ 1,300. 
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in poor have income the same as the minimum cost of living, and those in general have 
income above the minimum cost of living. The reference category is the general group. 
The variable “business type” captures the main business item and sphere which 
are carried out by the operation of the microenterprise. Although there are many possible 
ways for grouping types of businesses, I categorized them into eight types, which are the 
categories used by the Korean Standard Industrial Classification (referred to here as 
“KSIC”): restaurants, wholesale/retail stores, general services, social services, businesses 
supporting services, manufacturing enterprises, construction enterprises, and 
farming/forestry enterprises. These business types are described in more detail in table 14. 
Social services are considered the reference category.  
3.3.1.1 General Characteristics of Microenterprises 
The organizational forms of the microenterprises were usually individuals. There 
were 322 enterprises run by just one individual, which makes 74.9% of the total. The 
owners of microenterprises were usually females (287 enterprises, 66.7% of the total). 
The income level of the owners was usually fragile, that is, their income is the same or 
below the minimum cost of living (375 enterprises, 87.2% of the total). This group 
included owners in the poorest (138 enterprises, 32.0% of the total), those in a less poor 
(167 enterprises, 38.8% of the total), and those in a mixed group (70 enterprises, 16.3% 
of the total). As for the business type, a large portion of the businesses were restaurants 
(102 enterprises, 23.7% of the total) and wholesale / retail businesses (93, 21.6%). The 
next in order was general service businesses (70, 16.3%) and then social service 
businesses (68, 15.8%).  
 63 
 
The overall survival ratio of microenterprise in the data set, which is defined as 
(total number of ongoing microenterprises) / (total number of microenterprises), is around 
80%. This number coincides with the overall survival ratio of enterprises in USA. It is, 
however, unclear that this result comes from microcredit, because we do not know on 
what point microcredit was given to microenterprises in the Korean data set. 
3.3.2 Regression Equation 
Using the definitions of the variables in the previous section, I constructed a logit 
regression model with an intersection; 
(3. 1)    Logit [ Prob (Live = 1) ] = β0 + β1 Sole + β2 Male + β3 Female + β4 Poorest + β5 
Poor + β6 Joint + β7 Food + β8 Sale + β9 General + β10 Support + β11 Manufac + β12 Cons 
+ β13 Farm 
, where Prob (·) stands for the probability of (·), Live is a binary variable for survive or 
quit, Sole stands for the sole proprietorship form of organizational form, Poorest, Poor, 
and Joint stand for the poorest, poor, and joint income groups respectively, and Food, 
Sale, General, Support, Manufac, Cons, Farm stand for the KSIC business types (i.e. 
restaurants, wholesale/retail stores, general services, social services, businesses 
supporting services, manufacturing enterprises, construction enterprises, and 
farming/forestry enterprises). 
3.3.3 The Result and Implication 
Since every requirement was satisfied, I implemented this model using Stata, a 
statistical package. Table 15 shows the estimation results of the logit model. Note that the 
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organizational form variable and sex variable are not statistically significant in the 
probability of survival since the p-values of the coefficients of sole, male, and female are 
very high. Thus these results have limited significance. 
I implemented another logit regression model after I removed statistically 
insignificant variables (i.e. organizational form and sex). Table 16 shows the estimation 
results of this logit model. We can see that the impacts of subcategories of independent 
variables on the probability of survival vary.  
The estimation results for independent variables give us information about the 
relative magnitude of impact as well as the direction of impact. The negative signs of the 
estimated coefficients for the subcategories of the income level of the owner(s) indicated 
that the poorest, the poor, and the mixture microenterprises have less probability of 
surviving than the general enterprises. According to the size of the absolute values of the 
estimated coefficient for each subcategory, the negative impact is the biggest for the 
poorest enterprises, and a little smaller for the poor enterprises, and finally the least for 
the mixture enterprises. 
Compared to the standard, which are the social service enterprises, the other 
business type enterprises are less likely to survive. For the other enterprises, the order of 
negative impact starting from the least to the most are manufacturing enterprises, general 
services, businesses supporting services, whole sale/retail stores, farming/forestry 
enterprises, and  restaurants. 
From the above results, I can find a policy implication for microcredit to help 
more microenterprise survive in the market. The estimation result shows that the 
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enterprise was the less likely to survive as the income level of the owner(s) became less. 
Thus as the level of the owner(s) became less, more support with the goal of increasing 
microenterprises survival ratio (e.g. expert consultations, regular operation outcome 
monitoring, and additional loans, if needed) should be provided. 
3.4 Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Several factors should be controlled to increase the survival rate of ongoing 
business enterprises. I used the Cox model with proportional hazard7 to discover which 
factors should be controlled. The hazard in the model is the probability that an enterprise 
will fail. Organizational form, sex of the owner(s), income level of the owner(s), and 
business types are independent variables in this model. 
3.4.1 Model 
Using the same definition of the variables in the previous section, I constructed 
the following Cox Hazard Model,  
(3. 2)     λ(t | x) = Exp {x’ β} = Exp { β1 Sole + β2 Male + β3 Female + β4 Poorest + β5 
Poor + β6 Mix + β7 Food + β8 Sale + β9 General + β10 Support + β11 Manufac + β12 Cons 
+ β13 Farm}    
                                                 
7 Proportional hazards models are a sub-class of survival models in statistics, in which the effect 
of a treatment under study has a multiplicative effect on the subject's hazard rate. For example, a 
drug may halve one's immediate probability of stroke. This is in contrast to additive hazards 
models, wherein a treatment may increase one's hazard by a fixed amount which is independent 
of other covariates. 
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, where λ(t | x) is a hazard function and the notation for the other variables are the same 
as before; Sole stands for the sole proprietorship form of organizational form, Poorest, 
Poor, and Mix stand for the poorest, poor, and mixture economic situation groups 
respectively, and Food, Sale, General, Support, Manufac, Cons, Farm stand for the KSIC 
business types (restaurants, wholesale/retail stores, general services, social services, 
businesses supporting services, manufacturing enterprises, and construction enterprises, 
and farming/forestry enterprises). 
3.4.2 The Result and Implication 
I used Stata to implement this model. Table 17 shows the estimation results of the 
Cox proportional hazard model. In the estimation results, a hazard ratio equals one is 
standard. That is, if the hazard ratio is higher than one, the variable makes the probability 
of survival less than the standard category does. In other case, i.e. if the hazard ratio is 
less than one, the variable makes the probability of survival more than the standard 
category does. Note that the sex variable is not statistically significant in the hazard ratio 
since the p-values of the coefficients of male and female are very high. Thus we can say 
that these results have limited significance. 
I implemented another Cox proportional hazard model after I removed 
statistically insignificant variable (i.e. sex variable). Table 18 shows the estimation results 
of this Cox proportional hazard model.  
There are several results which stand out. The impact of subcategories of 
independent variables on the hazard (the probability of quit) vary. Sole proprietorships 
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have higher hazard rate (which implies that they are less likely to survive) than joint 
ventures, because the estimated hazard ratio for sole proprietorships is greater than 1.  
The estimation results for the other independent variables give us information 
about the relative magnitude of impact as well as the direction of impact. From the fact 
that the estimated hazard ratio for the subcategories of the economic situations are higher 
than 1, we can conclude that the poorest, the poor, and the mixed microenterprises have 
higher hazard rates (which implies that they are less likely to survive) than the general 
enterprises. The positive impact on hazard is the biggest for the mixture cases, then the 
poorest cases, and finally the least for the poor cases, according to the size of the relative 
magnitudes of estimated hazard ratios. 
Compared to the standard, which are the social service enterprises, the other 
businesses have higher hazard rate (which implies that they are less likely to survive). For 
the other enterprises, the order of the magnitudes of hazard from the least to the most are 
wholesale/retail stores, general services, manufacturing enterprises, construction 
enterprises, businesses supporting services, restaurants, and farming/forestry enterprises. 
Those business types with high hazard rate (farming/forestry enterprises, 
restaurants, and business supporting services) are usually labor intensive and don’t 
require professional techniques or huge amount of capital. Low entry barriers, however, 
accelerate competition among enterprises, which results in a low survival ratio. 
Microenterprises in construction and manufacturing cannot efficiently cope with the 
change of the market, because their capital is usually small and they lack the expertise. 
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The above results have some policy implications for microcredit. In each variable 
group, there are subcategories which have the least hazard (for example, in the 
organizational form joint ventures and in the business group social services). MFIs 
should encourage new business microenterprises which have a less hazard. 
3.5 Interviews with the Clients of SSB 
The evidence on the effectiveness of microfinance institution is limited, because 
the data on the performances of microenterprises are not enough to carry out thorough 
econometric tests. The results from econometric models are indicative but incomplete, 
because the categorical variables are chosen as independent variables, the numbers 
available are limited, and the time period is short. Thus we need to supplement existing 
data with field work including interviews of the clients of SSB. 
I had interviews with several clients of SSB in Korea for three times on 
November and December 2009. My overall impression was that they were very happy to 
(re)start their businesses thanks to microcredit and they had strong plans for bright future. 
(See figure 7 for the pictures of the enterprises which I had interviews) 
First, I had interviews with two microenterprises with male owner(s) and the same 
business type (manufacturing enterprises). The only difference lies in the organizational 
form. That is, one enterprise is run by the owner himself and the other one has two 
owners. In the previous concept, one is a sole proprietorship enterprise and the other is a 
joint venture enterprise. It seemed to me that both enterprises had a promising business 
plan, although their specific business spheres are different; i.e. one manufactured red 
pepper powder and the other manufactured interior lights. Since the sole proprietorship 
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enterprise don’t have an employee, he should cover every stages of business, such as 
buying raw materials, making red pepper powder, and managing repayment. So he was 
really busy and at times his business became out of control. More over this situation 
made it difficult for him to find time which he can spend with his family members. The 
partners in the other joint venture are brothers. The older brother has an expertise in 
manufacturing lights, especially decorative interior lights using LED, and the younger 
brother has an expertise in marketing and sales. They divide their role in their businesses, 
which is a quite different from the proprietorship case. Based on efficient division of 
labor, I think they can co-operate each other and make their business more profitable.  
Next, I had an interview with a woman who runs a Korean restaurant. I could feel 
that she had a lot of burdens. Besides her being suffered from arthritis, she should take 
care of her husband, who was a disabled veteran from the Vietnam War. Without 
professional knowledge, she started to run a restaurant 10 years ago. She used to try to 
overcome her economic difficulty by borrowing loans from local money lenders. She said 
that she got tough treatment from local money lenders when they forced her to repay the 
loan without considering her economic situation. She could reopen her restaurant with 
microcredit and she hoped that she succeed in her business and can buy a house in which 
all her family live together. 
Another interview with a woman who was running a laundry reveals the 
difficulties of women businessman in Korea. She led her family by herself by running a 
laundry business after her husband died 20 years ago. She was over sixty in 2009 and she 
felt at times that it was too hard for her to continue running laundry, because her eye sight 
became weaker and weaker and her business lost competitiveness to other laundries 
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which were run by the young. She moved into the neighbor of her daughter and opened a 
new laundry there. She was satisfied with the support from a relationship manager (RM), 
who is a staff in SSB. She got both mental support and business support during the 
regular visit by a RM. 
The interviews with the clients of SSB gave me clear impression of the current 
state of microfinance in Korea. There are a lot of things to be done to make microfinance 
put down roots in Korea. But I could also see the potentials of microfinance. The clients 
have strong willingness to support themselves and look forward to becoming successful 
entrepreneurs. They already had a promising business plans and started to accumulate 
marketing skills, which are inevitable assets to survive in market competitions. If 
provided appropriate supports both from MFIs and from the Korean government, the 
microenterprises can bring remarkable progress on businesses, help the poor overcome 
their state of poverty, and result in social integration. 
3.6 Microcredit in Korea History and Culture 
As I explained in previous chapters, microfinance has been played both as finance 
and as empowerment. Recently Chung Youngsoon (2008) used path analysis to examine 
how a microenterprise support program impacts participants’ psychological and financial 
improvements as interim outcomes and also their increased income and economic 
independence from public assistance as final outcomes. The path analysis demonstrated 
that perceived assistance from the support program directly impacted their self-esteem 
and net-income as psychological and financial outcomes, and that through a mediation of 
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these outcomes, the support contributed to increased income and independence from 
public assistance as final results. 
It is interesting to note that there was a social reform movement in Korea history 
to pursue the similar idea as microfinance. It was Sirhak, the School of Practical Learning, 
in the middle of the 17th century. Yu Hyong-won was one of the greatest Sirhak 
philosophers. He saw that the wealthy people at his time had too much land whereas the 
pool had too little. According to him, all farmers should be granted at least a minimum 
amount of land to support a good living for the entire family. His analysis for the wealth 
concentration phenomenon exactly coincides with my explanation why microfinance is 
needed in Korea in the second chapter. The idea of giving a mean of production (land at 
his times) to the poor is basically the same idea as giving small amount of money in 
microfinance these days. 
The emergence of the Sirhak expanded the ideology of human rights and equality 
irrespective of social classes and gender. For example, Chung Yak-Yong, another great 
thinker of Sirhak, advised that men and women, old and young, each must possess 
professions fitting to their abilities. His philosophy incurred gradual changes in 
traditional norms and the woman’s role in late Chosun Dynasty in Korea history. We 
have currently witnessed the similar phenomenon in microfinance. That is, microfinance 
has been praised as empowerment for the poor and women in society. 
The relative magnitude between the role of finance and empowerment, however, 
depends on the country and its culture. According to the results from econometric models 
and interviews, female enterprises show lower survive ratios than male enterprises. This 
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result is quite different from the results in other countries. In other countries women are 
usually the main targets for the microfinance due to high probability of success. 
The reasons for the Korean result are as follows. First, women have to carry out 
both enterprise and household chores even after they start the business. Due to 
authoritarian tradition which has deep roots in society, husband is reluctant to share 
household chores. It is usually women or mother who will usually take care of the kids in 
the case of the divorce. In the interviews, both women have taken care of their families 
for a long time. Next is women’s inferior social status in Korea. The human capital for 
female is usually lower than it is for male. It has been a long culture since ancient times 
that family favored male offspring. This attitude results in offering better education 
opportunity for son than for daughter. Also there exist social prejudice against women 
and the favor forward men in business world. Additionally women usually have deficient 
careers in labor market and insufficient experiences in business. Thus women tend to 
choose labor intensive business types (e.g. cleaning, sewing, and cooking), which are less 
profitable than those chosen by male enterprises. 
We need to notice that even those who did not fulfill the financial obligation can 
get microcredit in Korea. This is quite different from the practices in other countries. 
Social shock from the foreign currency crises has been casting deep impacts on the whole 
economy and many laid off still suffer economic difficulties. Oversupply of the credit 
card in the early 1990’s produced a lot of people with bad credit. It has been social 
consensus that they should be given opportunities to overcome difficulties from their 
mismanaging financial decisions. They are different in economic ability from those who 
are excluded from the financial institutions continuously. That is, they have more 
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experience, human capital, and social networks. The relative proportion of men in this 
group is higher than that of women, because men usually more actively involved in 
occupation and thus suffer more from the economic shock impacts than women did. In 
brief, using their high human capital, business experience, and social networks, male 
microenterprises (which once failed but were given another opportunity) have shown 
better results than female microenterprises in Korea. 
3.7 Survival of New Business in U.S.A 
I implemented the same econometric models for USA data to compare the results 
with what I found from the Korea data.  
3.7.1 Data Set 
For this analysis, I used the public use file of the Kauffman Firm Survey (referred 
to here as “KF Survey”). The target population of KF Survey was all new businesses that 
were started in the 2004 calendar year in the United States (the 50 states plus the District 
of Columbia). The KF Survey has a lot of information, including organizational form, the 
sex of the owner(s) on each new enterprise. This is the reason why I chose KF Survey as 
the data set for this analysis. But the data in KF Survey is not restricted to small business, 
which make KF Survey different from the Korea data on microenterprises. 
From the enormous information in KF Survey, I extracted corresponding USA 
variables (organizational form, sex of the owner(s), income level of the owner(s), type of 
business) to compare with the Korea variables. For organizational form, I used the data 
under the code of c2_owners. The explanation for this code at KF Survey code book is 
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the number of individuals or entities who owned the business. The businesses with values 
bigger than 1 in the KF Survey are considered to be joint ventures, which is standard 
category. Enterprises with a value of 1 are considered to be the sole proprietorship form. 
If the recent survey did not have any data, I used data from a previous survey8. 
The data under the code name g10_gender_owner_019 were used for sex variable. 
Male is the standard category. If the recent survey did not have any data on sex, I used 
data from a previous survey. 
To find data from the KF Survey to match the income level of the owner(s) in 
Korea, I supposed that education levels of owners are closely correlated with their 
income level. Under this assumption, I used the data for owner education level, which 
can be found under the code name g9_education_owner-01, as a proxy for the income 
level of the owner(s) in Korea. I divide education levels into 4 sublevels; the lowest level 
for education level of less than 9th grade, low level for either no high school diploma or 
possessing a graduate diploma, high level for possessing a vocational education degree or 
a BA degree, and the highest level for education beyond a BA degree.  
To get the data for business type for each enterprise, I modify the NAICS code for 
the KF Survey into KSIC code, using social service as the standard. The detailed code for 
                                                 
8 The baseline survey ended on July 2006 and the first follow-up was finished on January 2007, 
whose date is denoted by the suffix form, _1 after the code number. Then Second follow-up was 
done on December 2007, denoted by _2, and the third follow-up with notation of _3 , which is the 
most recent survey, was finished on April 2009.  
9 The explanation for this code at KF Survey code book is “is owner male of female”. 
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each business type is the same as that in the Korea data. As for the business failure 
variable, the data under the code of a5_actively_involved10 was used.  
If any data with respect to organizational form, sex of the owner(s), income level 
of the owner(s), business type, and business failure is incomplete, I remove the enterprise 
from the data set.  
After carrying out all the previously mentioned procedures, I got data set for 
4,258 new enterprises. This is the data set which is used to carry out the following 
analysis. 
3.7.2 Logit Regression and Cox Proportional Hazard Model for USA Data 
I implemented the same logit regression model in equation (3.1) and the same 
Cox proportional hazard model in equation (3.2) using the KF Survey. Table 19 shows 
the estimation results of the logit regression model and table 20 shows the estimation 
results of the Cox proportional hazard model respectively. 
The results from the US data were compared to the results from the Korea data11. 
According to US results for organizational forms both from the logit regression model 
and the Cox proportional hazard model, sole proprietorship enterprises showed a higher 
probability of survival than the joint ventures. This result is opposite what it was for the 
                                                 
10 The explanation for this code at KF Survey code book is “actively involved in running the 
business”. 
11 The results from the US data on sex variables are excluded in comparison, because the sex 
variable is statistically insignificant in both models. 
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Korea results. The reasons for this are as follows. (1) The data for the USA is not 
restricted to small business, while the data from Korea is only from microenterprises. (2) 
Sole proprietorship enterprises have a comparative advantage in managing economic 
change in the US, because their decision making is quick and thus efficient. 
Comparing education level, the probability of survival increased as the education 
level went up both in the logit regression model and in the Cox proportional hazard 
model. This was the same result for Korea data using the income level of the owner(s).  
Concerning business types in the US, the logit regression model shows that 
several businesses (e.g. construction enterprises, general services, and manufacturing 
enterprises) were expected to have a higher probability of survival rate than the social 
services. The Cox proportional hazard model shows that the social services in the US 
according to KF Survey are expected to survive the shortest. The economic surroundings 
in US which put emphasis on free competition in the market favor other businesses which 
actively operate in the market place than social services which lie under the protection of 
the government. The different economic circumstances in US lead to the different results 
on the survival ratio among business types in US from the Korea results, which predicted 
that the social services in Korea were expected to have the highest survival probability.  
3.8 Conclusion 
Based on the history on microfinance in other countries, microenterprise can be 
competitive in the market if they overcome obstacles in their first stages. This chapter 
analyzes the factors which impact up on the survival of microenterprises using two 
econometric methods (the logit regression model and the Cox proportional hazard model). 
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Attributes of microenterprises, such as organizational form, sex of the owner(s), income 
level of the owner(s), and types of business are chosen as independent variables which 
may have impact on the survival. The results from the econometric models indicate that 
more support should be provided when the income level of the owner(s) became less if 
we want to make more microenterprises survive. Table 21 summarizes the results. The 
direction of impact or the relative magnitudes of impact is not exactly the same between 
two econometric methods. Therefore, proper interpretation and fine tuning are needed in 
applying the results into the real microcredit world. 
Microfinance has been praised both as finance and as empowerment. The specific 
role of microfinance depends on the country and its culture. Due to this, the same 
econometric models using the US KF Survey lead to the different results from the Korea 
results. In Korea history, Sirhak pursued the similar idea as microfinance by insisting on 
giving land to the poor (comparable to finance these days) and emphasizing the ideology 
of human rights and equality (comparable to empowerment in microfinance). The impact 
of microfinance for the poor, especially poor women, in Korean culture is still weak, 
which is confirmed by the results from econometric models and interviews. Now is the 
time for Korean society to put in a lot of effort to enhance the role of microenterprise and 
I hope that my exploratory study of the survival of microenterprises contributes a little 
part of it. 
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Table 13.  Estimates of Potential Profit Rates for Microenterprises in Bangladesh 
Potential 
small 
business 
enterprises 
Average 
capital 
requirement
($) 
Average 
estimated 
profit/month
($) 
Average 
estimated 
profit/Year
($) 
Profit 
Rate per 
Year 
(%) 
Average 
Person 
Require- 
ment 
Advertisement  
business 
1,440 1,008 12,096 840.00 5 
Cosmetics 
business 
1,224 187 2,246 183.53 2 
Electric 
shop 
1,015 192 2,300 226.38 2 
Fruits 
business 
677 197 2,372 350.43 1 
Furniture 
shop 
954 194 2,333 244.53 3 
Grocery 
shop 
903 155 1,863 206.34 1 
Jewelry 
 shop 
1,440 288 3,456 240.00 3 
Laundry 
 shop 
1,440 173 2,076 144.00 2 
Pharmacy 612 108 1,296 211.76 2 
Raw material 
business 
654 110 1,320 201.30 2 
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Table 14.  Description on Business Types 
Classification C l a s s e s 
Restaurant 
Korean-style food, flour based meals, pizza, chicken, bakery, 
etc. 
wholesale / retail textile, clothing, electronics, cosmetics, shoes,  groceries, etc. 
General service Beauty salon, fixing personnel/home material, laundry, etc. 
Social service Educational institute, nursing, child care, sports facility, etc 
Business  
supporting service 
Cleaning building, commercial,  transportation, lease, 
communication, etc. 
Manufacturing 
manufacture food stuff, plastic and metal, wood stuff, and 
clothing, printing, etc. 
Construction 
Public works, pipe laying, heating/cooling, painting, papering 
walls, interior, etc. 
farming / forestry 
Agriculture, crop cultivating, stock breeding, forestry, logging, 
etc. 
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Table 15.  Estimation Results by Logit Regression Model (1) 
quit Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sole -.3056788 .5492445 -0.56 0.578 -1.382178   .7708207 
male -.0199471 .7538187 -0.03 0.979 -1.497404     1.45751 
female -.5439272 .6987416 -0.78 0.436 -1.913436    .8255811 
poorest -1.20559 .5523717 -2.18 0.029 -2.288219   -.1229617 
poor -1.09117 .5315769 -2.05 0.040 -2.133041   -.0492983 
mix -.4100586 .837419 -0.49 0.624 -2.05137    1.231252 
food -1.561784 .488428 -3.20 0.001 -2.519086    -.604483 
sale -1.304711 .498062 -2.62 0.009 -2.280895   -.3285273 
general -.2046318 .5667589 -0.36 0.718 -1.315459    .9061953 
support -1.246647 .6277853 -1.99 0.047 -2.477083   -.0162102 
manufac -.3005015 .7566556 -0.40 0.691 -1.783519    1.182516 
farm -1.903415 .993946 -1.92 0.055 -3.851513    .0446836 
_cons 3.953713 .9724948 4.07 0.000 2.047658    5.859768 
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Table 16.  Estimation Results by Logit Regression Model (2) 
quit Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
poorest -1.244926  .530984 -2.34 0.019 -2.285635   -.2042165 
poor -1.138717  .5249323 -2.17 0.030 -2.167565   -.1098681 
mix -0673855  .6657794 -0.10 0.919 -1.372289    1.237518 
food -1.56428  .4840874 - 3.23 0.001 -2.513074   -.6154861 
sale -1.267997  .494481 -2.56 0.010 -2.237162   -.2988323 
general -.2590695  .5633018 -0.46 0.646 -1.363121    .8449818 
support -1.063573  .6133356 -1.73 0.083 -2.265689    .1385426 
manufac -.1746248  .7498597 -0.23 0.816 -1.644323    1.295073 
farm -1.545623  .9614662 -1.61 0.108 -3.430062    .3388163 
_cons 3.266202  .6508319 5.02 0.000 1.990594    4.541809 
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Table 17.  Estimation Results by Cox Proportional Hazard Model (1) 
_t  Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sole 2.536184 .6618097 3.57 0.000 1.520766        4.2296 
male .81637 .3035041 -0.55 0.585 .3939431     1.691767
female 1.088263 .3895788 0.24 0.813 .5395337     2.195072
poorest 4.485976 1.049906 6.41 0.000 2.83557         7.096981
poor 3.848038 .8282217 6.26 0.000 2.523674       5.867395
mix 5.269211 1.962709 4.46 0.000 2.539129     10.93469 
food 1.572047 .3532557 2.01 0.044 1.012026       2.441966
sale 1.049628 .2351443 0.22 0.829 .676618       1.628272
general 1.074105 .2648888 0.29 0.772 .6624135     1.741665
support 1.745088 .5194525 1.87 0.061 .9737422     3.127452
manufac 1.249942 .3653086 0.76 0.445 .7048838     2.216473
cons 1.702966 .6998802 1.30 0.195 .7609945     3.810925
farm 1.733413 1.368477 0.70 0.486 .3688963     8.145167
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Table 18.  Estimation Results by Cox Proportional Hazard Model (2) 
_t Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sole 2.449097  .6257387 3.51 0.000 1.484315  4.040974 
poorest 4.846489  1.110348 6.89 0.000 3.093242    7.593475 
poor 4.021449  .850728 6.58 0.000 2.656519    6.087686 
mix 5.604438  2.019829 4.78 0.000 2.765417    11.35804 
food 1.636319  .3637735 2.22 0.027 1.058365    2.529882 
sale 1.031912  .2300938 0.14 0.888 .6665663    1.597504 
general 1.103513  .2715645 0.40 0.689 .6812468    1.787518 
support 1.608377  .4684823 1.63 0.103 .9087681    2.846576 
manufac 1.146871  .3257104 0.48 0.629 .6573154    2.001036 
cons 1.545589  .5642816 1.19 0.233 .7556614    3.161262 
farm 1.638303  1.244476 0.65 0.516 .3696668    7.260691 
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Table 19.  Estimation Results by Logit Regression Models for USA KF Survey 
quit Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
sole 1.623786 .2772954 5.86 0.000 1.080297    2.167275 
female -.0900873 .2745312 -0.33 0.743 -.6281585    .4479839 
low -.7015426  .4586148 -1.53 0.126 -1.600411    .1973258 
high -.6629636 .3091701 -2.14 0.032 -1.268926   -.0570014 
food .2777984 .7848871 0.35 0.723 -1.260552    1.816149 
sale .4069404 .6652858 0.61 0.541 -.8969958    1.710877 
general .8059807 .7823731 1.03 0.303 -.7274424    2.339404 
support .3965382 .6209277 0.64 0.523 -.8204577    1.613534 
manufac .4071071 .661165 0.62 0.538 -.8887524    1.702967 
cons 1.269782 .8381402 1.51 0.130 -.3729431    2.912506 
_cons 3.421996 .6380305 5.36 0.000 2.171479    4.672513 
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Table 20.  Estimation Results by Cox Proportional Hazard Model for USA KF 
Survey 
_t  Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sole .984563 .0315702 -0.49 0.628 .9245908    1.048425 
female .9986932 .0358554 -0.04 0.971 .9308335      1.0715 
lowest 1.00101 .2798317 0.00 0.997 .5787426    1.731375 
low 1.006764 .055988 0.12 0.904 .9027987    1.122702 
high 1.009391 .0362671 0.26 0.795 .9407535    1.083035 
food .9736227 .1127821 -0.23 0.817 .7758711    1.221777 
sale .9886326 .0927423 -0.12 0.903 .8225927    1.188188 
general .9814193 .0980877 -0.19 0.851 .806829    1.193789 
support .9862984 .0867363 -0.16 0.875 .8301424    1.171828 
manufac .9879938 .0938674 -0.13 0.899 .8201309    1.190214 
cons .9769099 .0987283 -0.23 0.817 .8013652    1.190909 
farm .9743442 .1768402 -0.14 0.886 .6826878    1.390601 
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Table 21.  The Relative Magnitudes of Impacts 
Classification Logit Regression Model Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Organizational Form Sole <* Joint Sole < Joint 
Sex Female < Male < joint Female < Joint < Male 
Income Level 
the Poorest < Poor < 
Mixture < General 
Mixture < the Poorest < Poor < 
General 
Business Types 
Farm < Food < Sale < 
Support < Manufacture < 
General < Social 
Support < Farm < Construction < 
Food < Manufacture < General < 
Social 
 
Notes: * < stands for the higher probability of survival. 
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Figure 7.  The Pictures of the Microenterprises in Korea 
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Figure 7 (cont.) 
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Chapter 4 
 
Agent Based Model of the Impact of Microfinance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the impact of microfinance on the income level of the poor 
and the repayment ratio of microcredit. This task is carried out by a simulation which is 
an agent based model. To implement this model, I used the NetLogo, which is an agent 
based modeling toolkit. 
To examine the impact of microfinance, analytical models incorporating so many 
situation variables are not tractable. Analytical models require simultaneous equation 
systems with difference, double difference to find the equilibriums for each market in the 
system. But there are many unobservable factors in the system, which makes the 
construction of a consistent system almost impossible. Thus a new analytical method was 
implemented. That is, an agent based model is an appropriate tool for studying the impact 
of microfinance, because it models the structures and procedures of microfinance in a real 
economy. First, it took some time for the agents who received microcredit from MFIs to 
start a microenterprise and acquire the fruits of their activity. To start their businesses, the 
agents had to prepare for start up by buying raw materials, renting a building and so forth. 
After producing a product, the agents need to sell their product in the market place and 
repay the microcredit. Modeling these procedures requires laws of motion for the system. 
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The agent’s wealth, the remaining loan, the number of production items, and the volume 
of sales are among the variables that have to be updated and adapted as the procedure 
repeats. Agent based modeling make it possible to build a macro model based on micro 
models of process and not an equilibrium values alone. 
Secondly, there are several heterogeneous agents and thus interactions among 
agents are an essential feature of the model. The whole population is composed of two 
kinds of groups, the poor and others. As lending agents, there are a microfinance 
institution (referred to here as “MFI”) and local money lenders. Each agent group is 
heterogeneous, because they face different situations and have different roles in the 
model. By resorting to agent based modeling, the model can reflect various aspects of the 
real world, make updates, and get results at various stages after the microfinance 
procedures start. 
To make an agent based model of microfinance, I carried out several processes. I 
need first to set several agent types and the environment for the model. Then I determined 
the laws of motion of each agent and how to update situation variables from the 
interactions among agents. The ways how to gather information should be also 
considered. In the following sections, I will explain in detail for these processes. 
4.2 Agents 
There are 5 types of agents 12  in the model; the poor in the population, the other 
people in the population, a MFI, local money lenders, and suppliers of raw materials.  
                                                 
12 The groups of the same types of agents are called “turtles” in the NetLogo. 
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The poor are defined as those in the population who have a relatively low level of 
wealth. Since the purpose of this model is to predict the impact of microcredit on the 
wealth level of the poor, the poor are the major targets who are supposed to receive 
continuous focus throughout all of the procedures. 
The other people in the population are obviously the individuals with more wealth 
than the poor. Their economic interactions with the poor are essential in evaluating the 
impact of microfinance.  
In the model, there are two kinds of institutions that lend money to the poor. One 
is a MFI and the other institution is local money lenders. Although both of these 
institutions carry out the same loan giving function, there are a lot of differences in the 
way they manage their loans, which will be explained below. 
As noted earlier, suppliers of raw materials are included in this model. Their role 
is important at the beginning of a new microenterprise. To start up a new business, the 
poor must acquire raw materials from suppliers. 
4.3 Basic Setup of the Model 
The agent based model is composed of a lot of variables and procedures. In this 
section, I will begin by explaining the basic setup of the model.  
4.3.1 Environment 
The environment is the model context in which agents live and interact with each 
other. The environment for this model is a virtual economy space where economic 
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transactions, such as borrowing, repaying, manufacturing, and trading, happen as time 
goes on. This space mimics economic activities in the actual world and helps us to 
capture the main feature of outputs as a result of economic transactions. This economy 
space is represented by a black square called the view, which is composed of a grid of 
patches on the interface tab13 window of the NetLogo program. The agents can move in 
this spatial environment. 
4.3.2 Creation of the Population 
Suppose that the number of the whole population of this economy is 300 and the 
portion of the poor in the population is 1/3. The number of the poor in the population is, 
therefore, 100 and the total number of the other people is 200. Individuals in the 
population are initially scattered randomly throughout the economic space. Every poor 
individual has his (or her) own characteristic values in terms of wealth, sex, and 
productivity level. More specifically, each individual has a wealth level which is drawn 
from a normal distribution N (50, 15). An individual’s sex index is of course either male 
or female. Suppose that the overall productivity of males is higher than it is for females14. 
The productivity level for a man is derived from a normal distribution of N (4, 1.5), while 
that for a woman is derived from N (3, 1). Note that the variance of productivity for 
males is bigger than it is for females, while the average productivity for males is higher 
                                                 
13 The NetLogo program presents three tabs; an interface tab, an information tab, and a procedure 
tab. The interface tab window visualizes the result of the simulation and has several keys to 
control it. 
14 The rationale for this possibility is that the overall education level for men is higher than it is 
for women and consequently women have lower human capital, which leads to a lower level of 
productivity. 
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than the average for females. The relative proportion of a sex is assumed to be half, but 
the exact number may not be exactly 1/2, because the allotment process utilizes a 
function which generates a random number. In the NetLogo program interface window, 
every individual has a human shape. In the interface window, the color of individuals in 
the poor group is yellow and the color of the others is pink. The parameter settings and 
the conditions for the model are listed in table 22.  
4.3.3 MFI and Local Money Lenders 
In this model, there is only one MFI. When I made the interface window, I put the 
MFI in the center of the economy space to emphasize its major role in the process of 
magnifying wealth for the poor. The MFI distributes microcredit which is a loan of small 
amounts of money to help the poor start a microenterprise. To simulate the impact of 
microcredit, I selected the following parameters for the MFI loans. (1) The total amount 
of fund available for loaning is set to be 1,000. The users of this model can manipulate 
this amount by controlling the microcredit-available slider15. (2) The maximum amount 
of money for each loan is set to be 10. Users can manipulate this value by controlling the 
credit-limit slider. (3) The interest rate charged by the MFI is set to be 10% a year. This 
level can be changeable by the interest-rate slider, if users want to analyze the impact of 
different interest rates.  
There are other lenders in this model. They are local money lenders. The number 
of these is set to be 4 to reflect the fact that in the real world there are far more local 
                                                 
15 In the interface window of a NetLogo program, there is a slider which can control level by 
dragging (sliding) the bar. 
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money lenders than there are MFIs. To capture the exploitative aspects of loans made by 
local money lenders, I selected red faces to represent these institutions. In the real 
economy, the interest rates charged by local lenders are usually much higher than those 
charged by MFIs. In the model, the local lenders’ interest rate is 3 times higher than that 
of the MFI. But the amount the local lenders provide for each loan is set to be 5, which is 
only half of the amount that the MFI provides.  
4.3.4 Raw Material Suppliers 
After getting a loan either from the MFI or from local money lenders, the 
individual has to get ready to start the business. For this purpose, he needs to buy raw 
materials, rent a store, and so forth. Because of the expense and the time required to start 
the business, I decided to have only 4 suppliers. Since there are so few suppliers, the 
individual(s) with money to invest have to spend a lot of time locating and traveling to 
see suppliers in order to buy raw materials from them. Time invested is in effect money 
spent, because the wealth level decreases as the poor spend time moving around. I will 
explain this in more detail later. For visual impact, I used grey trucks to represent the raw 
material suppliers. 
4.4 Interaction and Updating 
When the “go” button16 is pushed, the model starts and the agents act according to 
the laws of motion defined in the procedure window. This will be explained in detail 
                                                 
16 Clicking the “go” button starts the program and a series of procedures, which are composed of 
sub procedures which execute the simulation, over and over again. 
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below. The parameter settings and the conditions for the model are listed in table 22. 
Figure 8 shows the flow chart for this model. 
4.4.1 Population Movement 
If the model starts to run, the poor and the other individuals in the model move 
randomly around the economic space. This movement represents everyday transactions 
that are carried out by individuals. The wealth levels of individuals in the poor group 
decrease as they move around. I set the amount of decrease of wealth at 0.05 per day17, 
which is the amount that is spent by each individual in the model each day. 
4.4.2 Borrowing Activities 
In the model the poor with a promising business plan, i.e. those who have 
productivity level of 5 or above, directly apply as individuals for microcredit from the 
MFI. Note that I assume there is no depreciation in the process of turning their 
productivity to an actual plan. For example, individuals with productivity level higher 
than the threshold, 5, are able to make plausible business plans that have a high enough 
rate of return to convince the MFI executes to lend them microcredit. If a poor 
individual’s productivity is greater than 5, he will be able to have a high yield business 
project and consequently will be able to go directly to the MFI to get the money to invest 
in the project and will not have to consider participating in a joint business venture with 
other individuals. But in the following procedures, the realized rate of return is set to be 
                                                 
17 This functioning can be easily calculated by using the Netlogo “tick” command. A tick in the 
model stands for a completed day. The tick command in the program code calculates the number 
of days that have transpired in running the program.  
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the same across individuals. In this scenario, the productivity level plays a role in 
accessibility to microcredit in the process of getting loan. After microcredit is given to 
one of the poor, the amount of funds the MFI has to offer as microcredit is decreased and 
the debt of the poor is increased. When an individual borrows, his debt status will change. 
All of these changes are automatically updated by the NetLogo program.  
When an individual’s productivity is less than 5, his project is not promising so he 
will need to find a partner in order to pool resources to make the microenterprise possible. 
Thus, an individual with poor productivity moves around to find another individual. In 
the model, two individuals with limited productivity form joint ventures and pool their 
resources. When their combined productivity is 6 or above, they will be able to get 
microcredit from the MFI. I require the joint ventures to have a higher productivity level 
to reflect what occurs in the real world. If there are more than two candidates for a joint 
venture, the individuals who live close each other are assumed to be chosen. 
There are two cases in which individuals have to borrow money from local 
lenders. Sometimes the MFI does not have enough funds to lend to those poor who 
qualify for microcredit. When an individual has limited productivity and he is not able to 
find a suitable person with whom to form a joint venture, he becomes terribly poor. If his 
wealth level drops below 20, he will have to give up the idea of borrowing from the MFI 
and will go to local money lenders. The disadvantage in doing this is that he will only be 
able to borrow 1/2 the credit that the MFI generally offers and at an interest rate which is 
3 times as high. 
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4.4.3 Production Activities 
After the individual gets a loan either from the MFI or from a local lender (or 
lenders), he (or in cases of a joint loan “they”) get ready to start the business. He needs to 
buy raw materials. The purchase of raw materials is possible only when he meets a raw 
material supplier. Let’s suppose he can buy 1 unit of raw materials with 2 units of wealth 
and he buys 2 units of raw materials in each transaction.  
Instead of buying raw materials, the individual can hire a poor person who lives in 
the neighborhood to produce the goods. The individual(s) in the poor group with a 
severely low level of wealth (in the model, I set the severely low at below 20) who fails 
to get a loan may give up starting his own business and choose instead to be an employee. 
From the perspective of the employee, the earnings from employment (which in the 
model is 4 units) are a source of income for overcoming difficult economic situations. 
Remember these employees are in the severely poor wealth level group and that they 
failed to get a loan. 
Several additional assumptions in modeling the production procedure were made. 
(1) That inputs for the production are only raw materials and labor. (2) That 2 units of 
raw materials or 1 unit of labor will produce 1 unit of output. (3) That raw materials and 
labor are perfect substitutes. And finally, (4) that production is possible only after he 
accumulates raw materials to produce two units of products, i.e. 4 units of raw materials 
or 2 units of labors.  
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After products are produced in the model, the output and inventory numbers are 
calculated and updated systematically, based on the progress of production and trading, 
using the NetLogo program. 
4.4.4 Trading Activities 
If a poor individual succeeds in producing products and thus has inventory, the 
poor individual sells the product to other people in the population. Suppose that the 
individual can only sell the product if he has an inventory ≥2 and that the price of the 
product is 10 units of wealth. If this is the case, the seller get 6 units of wealth by selling 
1 unit of the product whose variable cost is 4 units (the price for 2 units of raw materials 
or 1 unit of labor). 
Of course, the individual sell the product to one of the poor. But this transaction is 
just transition of wealth from one of the poor to another. Thus it has no impact on the 
aggregate wealth level of the poor, which is the main focus of this model. In this sense, I 
assumed that transactions occur only between one of the poor and someone else that is in 
another group.   
4.4.5 Repayment Activities 
Using the profit from trading, the individuals can repay the loan to the MFI or to 
local money lenders. More specifically, the borrowers repay the microcredit only after 
they sell 5 units of products, by which they get 30 units of profit. But they repay the loans 
from local money lenders sooner, after they trade 4 units of products for 24 units of profit, 
due to the harder loan conditions compared to microcredit. The amount of repayment is 
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principal plus the daily interest total. The passing of time is calculated exactly using the 
tick18 function of the NetLogo program. 
4.4.6 Updating and Colors 
As I already explained earlier, the amount and status of debts are constantly 
updated, based on the results from each transaction. For example, no individual in the 
poor group is a borrower at the beginning. Thus the amount of debt starts off as zero and 
the status of debt is non-borrower. But if the individual gets a loan from the MFI or from 
a local money lender (or lenders), then the amount of debt increases and the status of debt 
changes to borrower. To carry out this updating, I had to define relevant variables and 
procedures19 in the NetLogo program, which are listed in table 23.  
To give a clear visual effect, I used 12 colors to indicate various changes in the 
status of the agents and their activities. The color notations are summarized in table 24. 
4.5 Special Features of the Model 
I designed this model to be versatile and to represent different real world 
microfinance situations. 
 
 
                                                 
18 In this program, each tick stands for one day and tick number increases by 1 as a day passes 
due to the “go” procedure. 
19 The details of all of the procedures are found in the procedure tab window in the NetLogo 
program. 
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4.5.1 Time Span 
This model was designed to analyze the impact of microfinance in economic 
periods chosen by the user(s), either policy makers or researchers. During the setup phase, 
a user can choose a time span by controlling the time-span-years slider. I set 5 years as 
the default (how many loan periods). Putting the command “tick” in the go procedure 
makes it possible for the tick to increase as time goes on. Each tick in this model stands 
for a day. Thus we can get income level of the poor and the repayment ratio of 
microcredit for any time during the 5 years, by entering relevant commands20 into the 
NetLogo program. 
4.5.2 Idiosyncratic Disaster 
In the real world, there are many idiosyncratic disasters, for example natural 
disasters and abrupt declines in market demand, which cannot be covered by insurance or 
other protective actions. I included the category, idiosyncratic disaster, in the model to 
represent these phenomena in the real world. In this model, the average probability of an 
idiosyncratic occurrence is set to be 5% of the running time. If an idiosyncratic disaster 
does occur, it affects the income of individuals with loan in such a way that there is no 
gain from trade while the seller normally get 6 units of profit from each trade without a 
disaster. To encode a disaster, the switch, “idiosyncratic disaster”, is used. The simulation 
produces result from a disaster if this switch is turned on, which make it possible to 
                                                 
20 The commands getting this information for a particular time are  
 set periods time-span-years  (in setup procedure) 
   if ticks >= 365 * periods [ stop ] (in go procedure). 
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compare the result that occurs when there is a disaster with the result that occurs (all 
other things being equal) when there is not a disaster. 
4.5.3 Gathering Information 
The Netlogo program updates the result of outcome variables in the monitors and 
shows dynamically changing plots in the interface window. I incorporate a lot of 
monitors and plots to show progression. In the NetLogo program, the monitors show 
number results and the plots show the graphs. The monitors and graphs update the results 
while the procedure is ongoing. 
I showed several results from the monitors. (1) The repayment ratio by the poor to 
the MFI, (2) the total amount of the loans from the MFI, (3) the total amount of the loans 
from the local money lenders, (4) the number of repayments to the MFI, and (5) the 
number of repayments to the local money lenders. 
I also showed several results from the plots. (1) The average wealth level for 
males and for females which are found in the Average Wealth plot. (2) The total amount 
of the loans from the MFI and from the local money lenders which are found in the Total 
Loan plot. (3) The number of repayments to the MFI and to the local money lenders 
which are found in the Payment plot. (4) The total amount of trade which is found in the 
Trade plot. (5) Finally, the number of producers which is found in the Producers plot. All 
of the plots from one simulation are listed in figure 9. 
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4.6 Results from the Simulation and Conclusion 
The simulation results of this model give ground for an optimistic view of 
microfinance. Figure 9 shows an example plot on the average wealth level for males and 
for females and an example monitor on the repayment ratio. The average wealth level of 
the poor decreased for a while, because it took some time to make products, trade, and 
gain the fruit of microenterprise. But after a certain period of time, the wealth level of the 
poor changed, increased, and then maintained a high level of rate of increase. The 
repayment rate results are very good, no lower than 90% and at times above 99%. These 
two results together suggest microfinance has a bright future, especially for increasing the 
wealth of the poor. 
The simulation of the agent based model shows that two different policy 
directions are needed to guarantee the success of microfinance. First, it is necessary to 
magnify positive impacts. There are at least two ways this can be done. You can increase 
the amount of microcredit to make it easier to start businesses and you can support an 
increase in the yield rate of return. Minimizing negative impacts is also important. This 
can be done by decreasing the interest rate charged by local money lenders and closely 
monitoring their behavior to see if they obey the usury law. 
I made the model flexible that is to be applicable to various setups. By designing 
the model to also include more complex issues, such as diffusion of information across 
agents, various grouping methods, and competition among lenders, I think it captures the 
real world interactions of microfinance with society. Since the model has these potentials, 
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it could be used in future researches by those who are interested in agent based modeling 
and microfinance. 
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Table 22. The Parameter Settings and the Conditions for the Model 
Classifi 
cation 
Agents / 
Procedure 
Variable Settings 
go 
move 
forward 
4 per each movement 
(poors, abovemiddles) 
Wealth decrease 0.05 per each movement 
borrow 
productivity 
requirement 
productivity >= 5 
Group formation 
requirement 
sum of productivities >= 6 
Condition to loan 
from local lenders 
wealth < 20 
buy raw 
materials 
Condition after 
repayment 
wealth >= 60 
bargaining condition 4 wealth : 2 material 
employ 
precondition raw material >= 1 
Employee requirement
wealth < 20, no loan either from 
MFI or from local lenders 
bargaining condition 1 labor : 4 wealth 
produce 
precondition raw material >= 4 or labor >= 2 
production 
transformation 
(2 raw material or 1 labor) → 1 
output 
trade 
precondition inventory >= 2 
Bargaining condition 
1 output : 10 wealth i.e. profit 6 
wealth with marginal cost 4 ( 2 
raw materials or 1 labor) 
idiosyncratic 
disaster 
probability 5 % 
loss when 
idiosyncratic happens 0 gain from trade (actually loss) 
 105 
 
Table 22 (cont.) 
Classifi 
cation 
Agents / 
Procedure 
Variable Settings 
Setup 
General periods 5 years i.e. 365 * 5 days 
MFI 
number 1 
fund 200 
interest rate for 
microcredit 
10% / year 
maximum amount of 
microcredit 
10 
raw material 
supplier 
number 4 
local money 
lender 
number 4 
poors 
number 100 
Wealth distribution  N (50, 15) 
Productivity for 
woman 
N (3, 1) 
Productivity for man N (4, 1.5) 
abovemiddles number 200 
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Table 23.  Variables for the Amount and the Status 
Classifica 
tion 
Variables Implication 
Global 
variables21 
periods 
The time span we consider. Number represents the year 
after the starting time. 
prob-disaster 
The probability of idiosyncratic disaster which give the 
seller loss from trade. 
loan-limit the limit of each microcredit 
fund 
Total microcredit amount that the MFI can provide to 
the poor. 
interestrate interest rate for the microcredit charged by the MFI. 
lender-interest 
interest rate for the loan charged by the local money 
lender. 
poors-own 
wealth each individual's wealth level 
sex each individual’s sex 
productivity each individual’s productivity level 
borrower-mfi? If true, the turtle has got a microcredit from the MFI. 
borrower-
lenders? 
if true, the turtle has got a microcredit from local money 
lenders 
debts-from-mfi the total amount of loan from the MFI 
debts-from-
lenders 
the total amount of loan from local money lenders 
repayment-for-
mfi 
indicates the number of how many times poors have 
repaid the debt for the MFI 
repayment-for-
lenders 
indicates the number of how many times poors have 
repaid the debt for local money lenders 
raw-materials 
amount of raw material bought by the poor to start up 
microenterprise 
  
                                                 
21 These variables will be available to all agents, while patches-own variables and poors-own 
variables will be available only to patches and the agents whose name is “poors” respectively. 
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Table 23 (cont.) 
Classifica 
tion 
Variables Implication 
poors-own 
producer? true if turtle has produced at least one production 
labor 
the amount of labor supply by employee or labor hired 
by the microenterprise 
employed? true if one of poors has worked at least once 
grouped? If true, the individual gets microcredit as a group 
joint 
The person that is our current joint in a group to get the 
microcredit for the MFI 
employee those who choose to work as an employee 
productions the amount of productions by poors 
inventory 
number of productions which are still in the hand of 
producer 
borrowingdate the date when one of poors get a loan from the MFI 
borrowingdate-
lenders 
the date when one of poors get a loan from local money 
lenders 
everpay? if true, a poor has repaid loan from the MFI. 
number-good-
pay 
the number of payment which is paid before maturity 
seller poors who sell production to the above-middles. 
amount-of-
trade 
number of sold productions from the poor to the 
abovemiddles. 
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Table 24.  Summary of Colors for the Status of Agents 
Classification Color Notations 
patches 
black background 
yellow MFI 
grey raw material supplier 
red Local money lender 
turtles 
yellow The poor 
pink The other in the population 
green The poor with microcredit 
red 
The poor with loan from local money 
lenders 
violet The poor after pay 
blue The poor in producing 
brown The poor who is an employee 
orange The poor in trading 
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Figure 9.  Example Plots and a Monitor from One Simulation 
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Chapter 5 
 
Various Proposals for the Development of Microfinance in 
Korea 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Korean society in the 1970s successfully implemented Saemaul Undong, a 
community-based integrated rural development program, which contributed to narrowing 
the developmental gap between urban cities and rural communities over a decade. Its 
success came from the adaptation of basic strategies of poverty reduction in the Korean 
context, which is to promote opportunities and facilitating empowerment for rural people. 
The matter in hand in Korea is to find optimal strategies to get the best result of 
microfinance in society and economy. That is, how to maximize the role of microfinance, 
both as finance and as empowerment, in the Korean context. Having made the case for 
microfinance in Korea plausible on both empirical and theoretical grounds so far, the 
floor is open to examine specific and practicable institutional changes. 
In this chapter, I suggest several strategies for the development of microfinance in 
Korea. The strategies are classified into three categories: rearrangement of the legal–
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economic system, expansion of the outreach of microfinance, and the welfare aspect of 
microfinance. 
5.2 Rearrangement of the Legal–Economic System 
In this section, I explain three topics that require amendments to the legal–
economic system to implement them: group lending, the legal status of the MFIs, and the 
use of arbitration committees. 
5.2.1 Introduction and Enforcement of Group Lending 
Group lending is one of the most original notions in microfinance and serves as an 
efficient method to make microfinance show good outcomes in repayments. I suggest that 
MFIs in Korea adopt this feature to maintain microcredit strategically. 
5.2.1.1 Current Status of Group Lending 
As explained above, MFIs in Korea focus mainly on individual lending. Even 
when a group loan is given, the members in that group usually engage in the same 
business, and the number of members is less than three. In short, the MFIs in Korea so far 
do not utilize group-lending in the traditional sense, which has the following features: (1) 
the number of members in a group is frequently more than five; (2) group members are 
responsible for their peers’ debt; and (3) the provision of loans in the future will be 
refused if the group defaults. 
Group lending can help solve two major problems that the MFIs must face due to 
asymmetric information; namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. Without these 
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skills, the Korean MFIs expend huge amounts of time and money to monitor the 
performance of microenterprises. In the following two sections, I explain how group 
lending helps to solve these problems. In the final sections, I mention several principles 
and suggest specific ideas on introducing and enforcing group-lending skills in Korea. 
5.2.1.2 Group Lending and Adverse Selection 
Group liability caused by group lending induces borrowers to engage in matching 
behavior. Suppose there are two types of borrowers: safe borrowers, who are more likely 
to repay the debts of their peers as well as their own; and risky borrowers, who are less 
likely to repay. Safe borrowers tend to pay more to match with safe borrowers than would 
risky borrowers. Thus, safe borrowers tend to group together, while risky borrowers tend 
to group together.  
Note that other group incentive mechanisms also contribute to solve adverse 
selection. Group members are responsible for their peers’ debt due to group liability in 
group lending. The provision of loans in the future will be refused if the group defaults. 
That is, risk pooling and peer pressure among group members are made through these 
group incentive mechanisms, which also help solve adverse selection. 
Above mentioned self-sorting of borrowers depends on the fact that individuals 
know each other and can assess the type of potential group members. Thus, this scheme 
is more appropriate in the rural areas in Korea, where people who live close together tend 
to know the characteristics of their neighbors. This grouping behavior is feasible only 
when group formation should be the result of choice by group members, and not as the 
result of selection by the MFIs. 
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5.2.1.3 Group Lending and Moral Hazard 
Suppose that borrowers are of the same type but each borrower can choose to 
invest funds from a loan in either a safe or a risky project. Then because of the absence of 
collateral the borrower tends to invest in a risky project. The borrower can shift the risk 
to the lender by investing in a risky project, because the lender has no recourse to recover 
the loss in the case of failure. 
However, group liability cannot be the solution for the moral hazard problem 
without monitoring. In fact, the group liability itself would make the problem even worse. 
Suppose that there are two borrowers, A and B, in the group. If A decides to select a risky 
project because he can shift risk to B, then B also would choose a risky project. Group 
liability, together with mutual monitoring, is a solution for the moral hazard problem. 
Consider a monitoring game in group lending (Guttman, 2006) to analyze moral 
hazard problem in more detail. This game captures the strategic situation and interaction 
between borrowers and can find the solution in the repeated lending. Figure 10 shows the 
payoff matrix for this game. 
There are two stages in this game. At the first stage, each borrower, A and B, 
chooses whether to monitor. At the second stage, each member chooses one of following 
two projects: Project 1 with return H that can be observed by the lender; and Project 2 
with a return b that cannot be observed by the lender. I need several further assumptions: 
(1) H > r (principal and interest), i.e., Project 1 is profitable if chosen; (2) b > H – r, i.e., 
the borrower prefers Project 2 to Project 1, which is a kind of “moral hazard”; and (3) b – 
S < H – r, i.e., if monitored with monitoring cost m, each borrower chooses to invest in 
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Project 1 and to repay the loan, rather than to invest and to cheat in Project 2 and to suffer 
social sanctions, whose value is –S.  
There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game: (1) (Does Not Monitor, 
Does Not Monitor); and (2) (Monitor, Monitor) if m ≤ c; i.e., monitoring is not too costly. 
To analyze the case of repeat lending, I need simply to add V, the present value of future 
loans, to all the payoffs except (Does Not Monitor, Does Not Monitor). Then (Monitor, 
Monitor) is the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium under normal conditions, which are 
H > r + c and V > m. 
To magnify the effect of group lending to solve the moral hazard problem, 
monitoring costs, c, are required to be not too high. In practice, this can be achieved by 
grouping together members with the same business types or with the same residential 
area. 
Note that the solution to the moral hazard problem, the (Monitor, Monitor) 
strategy, is the only Nash equilibrium outcome in the repeated lending game. Considering 
the normal conditions under normal conditions (H > r + c and V > m), progressive 
lending (which refers to the practice of promising larger amount of future loans) and the 
group lending scheme are required to guarantee this solution. 
5.2.1.4 Introduction and Enforcement of Group Lending 
In previous sections, I outlined four principles for introducing and enforcing 
group lending skills to guarantee group matching: (1) this scheme is more applicable in 
rural areas; (2) group formation should be the result of choice by group members, and not 
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as the result of selection by the MFIs; (3) it is desirable to group members who have the 
same business type or the same residence area to lower monitoring costs; and (4) it is 
necessary to carry out progressive lending with additional loan amounts as well as the 
group lending scheme. 
Mass lending can be one possible application of group lending skills in 
microcredit. Mass lending is to lend money to all individuals who meet the requirements 
such as membership and/or residence in the same building without individual 
examination. It is widely carried out in Korea. One example of mass lending is a loan by 
banks for removal expenses for every resident in an apartment complex when it is 
scheduled for reconstruction.  
There are many traditional markets that should be restructured and modernized. 
According to the report by the Financial Service Commission (September 2008), there 
are at least 80 traditional markets in Korea which need to be modernized. The minimum 
capital required for this task is $ 100,000 per market and $ 3,000 per vendor. The 
Microfinance Foundation among MFIs in Korea with large source of fund to target public 
project may launch this project. Vendors in these markets are usually poor and so are 
targets for microfinance. Because they interact closely for a long time, they meet all four 
principles outlined above. Thus, by combining group lending skills through peer 
monitoring and group pressure, in addition to mass lending skills, the borrowers can 
make investments more efficient and can enjoy the economy of scale. 
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5.2.2 Microsaving, Microinsurance, and Modification of the Legal Entity of 
Microfinance Institutions 
Up to this time, the MFIs have not carried out microsaving and microinsurance. 
The MFIs have mainly focused on microcredit and depended on outside funds from the 
public sector and donors plus repayments from microenterprises as their microcredit 
sources. They should not carry out these projects under Korean law regulating financial 
sectors (the Banking Act and the Insurance Business Act); i.e., without appropriate 
permission, businesses cannot accept deposits or offer insurance. The legal entities of the 
SSB and other MFIs in Korea are not financial companies but foundations. As long as the 
MFIs maintain current legal forms, it is illegal for them to offer microsaving or 
microinsurance.  
The situation of microsaving and microinsurance in Korea are the same as that in 
India in the sense that the impacts of microsaving and microinsurance are still weak. But 
the reason for the weak impacts is different. It is illegal in Korea for MFIs to offer 
microsaving or microinsurance, whereas in idea microsaving and microinsurance have 
not widely used by MFIs due to several practical reasons22. 
Therefore, I need to consider whether it is a good idea for the MFIs to expand 
their projects to include microsaving and microinsurance. If it is desirable, then it is 
necessary to work out how to bring this about. 
                                                 
22 For example, Ito and Kono (2009) suggest 3 reasons for this; (1) low take-up rates, (2) high 
claim rates, and (3) low renewal rates. 
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I first consider microsaving. Because there are many alternative types of saving, it 
could be thought not important or urgent to offer an additional way of saving. However, 
for the MFIs to be sustainable without subsidy from the government and donors, they 
should have their own resources for loans.  
MFIs need to consider securitization as another funding method. The basic 
procedures of securitization are as follows; (1) MFIs transfer their portfolio to a special 
purpose vehicle (referred to here as “SPV”), which is an independent legal entity for a 
securitization purpose. (2) The SPV issues special securities which are to be sold to 
investors in capital markets. The holder of these can enjoy money streams from the 
underlying assets held by the SPV. If MFIs guarantee loss default for the securities, it 
makes credit on the securities enhanced. Notice that securitization is a great help both to 
the MFIs and to investors. Securitization allows the MFIs to liquidate their assets before 
they mature. Investors can improve the quality of their investment portfolios through 
securitization which offers an opportunity to diversify. 
Microsaving has positive effects on the behavior of lenders, which ultimately 
mitigate the moral hazard problem that has deep negative roots in microfinance. The 
MFIs may require borrowers to show that they can save regularly for a period before they 
become eligible to borrow. By saving even before getting loans, they can accumulate 
discipline and money management skills that are essential for being a good borrower. By 
requiring participants to start saving regularly after getting loans, the MFIs can help the 
borrowers to build discipline and to have an initial capital base. 
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Equity is increased by microsaving. In general, collecting small deposits requires 
more transaction costs than those from collecting larger amounts of money. This may be 
the reason why banks often exclude poorer depositors by setting minimum balances or 
increasing service fees if their balances fall below a critical level. If the MFIs can handle 
microsaving, the transaction costs would be lower by managing loans together with 
deposits. Furthermore, considering the overall effects mentioned above, microsaving is a 
very lucrative project for the MFIs. 
However, in managing the microsaving, the MFIs need to note that low-income 
depositors usually want liquidity. Thus, they need more variety of funding sources to get 
a stable source for microcredit. MFIs can also handle liquidity problem by designing 
microsaving products in which there is a trade-off between liquidity and convenience. 
For example, MFIs can prevent liquidity problems from happening by offering access to 
a loan in an emergency. The poor usually may prefer to take a loan rather than draw 
money from their microsaving accounts. Thus the poor may sacrifice the convenience 
(which is compensated by an emergency loan), but the MFIs can solve the liquidity 
problem. 
I now consider microinsurance. Recently, one of the MFIs, MIF, has offered a 
microinsurance program jointly with insurance companies. If the poor purchase this 
microinsurance product, they can get an insurance benefit in cases such as death, casualty 
or hospitalization. Because 95% of the premium is supported by the MIF, the contractor 
only needs to pay 5% of the total. 
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I believe that the MFIs also need to provide for microinsurance to cover the 
microcredit problem. In cases such as death, casualty or hospitalization during the 
repayment period, the borrower should be protected by the insurance. By doing so, the 
MFIs can save the management cost and give an on-the-spot service to the poor. If 
buying insurance is mandatory, we can escape the adverse selection problem, resulting in 
decreases in the premiums. To protect the risk for the MFIs, they can reinsure with 
insurance companies, and the MFIs and insurance companies can cooperate with each 
other in dealing with the technical side of the provision of insurance. 
To make it possible for the MFIs to manage microsaving and microinsurance, it is 
necessary to enact an appropriate law that enables the MFIs as special financial 
organizations to cover both microsaving and microinsurance. In the law some restrictions 
should be levied on the products, because in other financial institutions, it is prohibited to 
cover both savings and insurance under the specialization requirement in the financial 
sector (which is based on the Banking Act and the Insurance Business Act). Thus, the 
MFIs’ products should be confined only to the poor so that they do not affect the normal 
financial markets. If the MFIs manage deposits, they should be under prudential 
regulations. However, if the usage of savings is restricted to safe and socially acceptable 
projects, the prudential regulation could be waived for this special organization. 
To carry out microsaving and microinsurance, the MFIs would need more 
branches as contact points for customers. Note that post offices that are branches of 
Korea Post also offer finance products including savings and insurance. Besides the main 
offices and eight local branches in big cities, there were a total of 3,669 post offices as of 
2007. The amount of financial services has steadily increased (see table 35 for detail). 
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Perhaps the postal finance service could be changed to permit microfinance services, or 
the MFIs could use nationwide postal offices as their branches. I will discuss later this 
topic in more detail. 
If the MFIs can engage in microsaving and microinsurance together, a mixed 
product is also possible, which can be considered another advantage. This could involve a 
microinsurance program with a savings component. If no accident covered by insurance 
occurs, then the customer would get the amount with interest. In this sense, it is same as 
the usual savings situation. However, if an accident occurs, the customer gets 
compensation from the insurance. If we design the maturities of these products in the 
schedule of the education of children and insure events such as death, casualty and 
hospitalization, this product could alleviate the expense of education and health care of 
children. Under the current law regulating compulsory education until middle school, the 
tuition waiver for middle school is applied nationwide. Thus, the whole cost for 
education in high school and above should be covered by the parents. The parents should 
also cover the expenses in private tutoring. Thus the compensation for each maturity 
(such as primary school graduation, middle school graduation, high school graduation, 
and so on) from this program should be increased as the children move into higher 
education. The result from the microinsurance by MIF and statistical data from the 
National Health Insurance can be used as a guideline data on accident occurrence in 
designing this program. 
In short, better service could be given to the poor by letting the MFIs to engage in 
both microsaving and microinsurance. 
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5.2.3 Establishment of Independent Committee to Mediate the Microcredit Issues 
Microcredit is carried out under a situation of asymmetric information. Thus, 
there is the possibility of the participation of borrowers in a more risky project than was 
approved, which is the “moral hazard” problem. If borrowers could commit to not 
undertaking the risky project credibly, the lenders—the MFIs—would readily lend them 
larger amounts at given interest rates. In reality, however, it is very hard to make the 
borrowers commit to contracts, because of huge judicial costs for trials if the borrowers 
fail to satisfy them. 
This commitment problem, however, could be solved by the establishment of an 
independent committee23 to mediate disputes regarding the microcredit issues. Specific 
schemes for this committee could be the following. (1) Procedures could be based on 
regular mediation so that the persons concerned could manage the situation without the 
help of lawyers. (2) By setting a time limit, say 90 days, after the dispute happens, there 
is pressure to compromise quickly, because if the borrowers and the MFIs failed in 
mediation, then they would need to have regular legal trials that require lots of time and 
money. (3) If a decision is made to follow the original contract or a new compromise is 
made, it has the same effect as the final judicial judgment. This is to prevent additional 
legal procedures. Because this procedure could be used in cases of dispute, the 
                                                 
23 The national tax tribunal (NTT) is an example of independent committee in Korea. NTT 
mediate the dispute regarding tax issue and if the decision to lower or cancel the tax was made, 
the tax authorities cannot appeal the decision. The committee members should have special 
knowledge on tax or enough experience on financial administration. 
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commitment problem at the contract stage would become less burdensome, so that 
transactions would happen more frequently. 
I consider the possible effects of the establishment of an independent committee 
in the following game. Figure 11 shows the situation without mediation, where the 
commitment problem happens. There are two stages in this game. At the first stage, a 
borrower chooses whether to commit to the contract. At the second stage, the MFI 
chooses whether to commence a lawsuit against the borrower in case the borrower does 
not commit to the contract. The payoff is given inside the brackets, where the first 
number is for the borrower and the second number is for the MFI. That is, if the borrower 
commits to the contract, each gets 75. If the borrower fails in committing to the contract 
and the MFI does not commence a lawsuit, the borrower obtains an additional payoff that 
is taken from the MFI, say 25. The resulting payoff for the borrower is 100, and that for 
the MFI is just 50. If the MFI chooses to commence a lawsuit, however, not only the 
payoff for the borrower but that for the MFI diminishes compared with the case of 
commitment. The payoff for the borrower decreases from 75 to 50 because of a penalty 
imposed by the court. The payoff for the MFI also decreases, from 75 to 50, which 
reflects the cost of the lawsuit in terms of time and money. There is no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium for this game. However, it can be shown that, for any α and β = 1/2, there is 
a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for this game, where α (β) is the probability of 
commitment by the borrower (the probability of no trial by the MFI). Thus, there is no 
deterministic law of action for the MFI, and the uncertainty of the borrower’s 
commitment (which is represented by arbitrary α) may shrink transactions. 
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Now, consider the case where a mediation procedure by an independent 
committee is introduced. Figure 12 shows the game tree for this case. The other payoffs 
at the first and second stages but the (not commitment, mediation) combination of 
strategies are the same as before. Now that the mediation procedure is possible, the lender 
can choose the mediation procedure if the borrower does not commit to the contract. 
Because the mediation procedure is designed to save time and money, the payoff for the 
borrower and the MFI in the case of accepting the mediation suggested by the committee 
is (70, 70), which is much higher than the case with the lawsuit. In the case of rejection of 
mediation, the payoff, (45, 45), becomes a little less than the case with the lawsuit, 
because of the cost of the mediation procedure. It can be shown by backward induction 
that (commit, mediation, accept) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and the resulting 
payoff for this would be (75, 75). In brief, by establishment of an independent committee 
to mediate the dispute regarding the microcredit issues, the commitment problem could 
be solved and both the borrower and the MFI could enjoy higher benefits. 
5.3 Expansion of the Outreach of Microfinance 
To extend the role of microfinance in Korea, it is necessary to expand the projects 
that are covered by the MFIs. Besides microsaving and microinsurance, which are 
explained above, it is desirable that the MFIs cover housing microfinance, and loans for 
the expenses of education and health care. The expansion of branches of the MFIs and the 
issue of economy of scale are discussed in the last section. 
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5.3.1 Housing Microfinance 
5.3.1.1 Necessities of Housing Microfinance 
The stability and quality of houses for the poor are very important for their 
everyday lives. Traditional mortgage finance, however, cannot satisfy the needs of the 
poor. Traditional mortgage loans are mainly to buy new houses, resulting in larger loans 
than the poor households can afford, while the poor usually need loans to renovate or 
rebuild their houses. Furthermore, traditional loans require collateral and have long-term 
repayment conditions with maturity of more than 10 years, which is opposed to the 
realities of life for the poor. Table 25 shows the maturity structure of mortgage loans 
from commercial banks, showing that the maturity of loans continuously increases. 
Housing microfinance around the world has recently drawn attention, especially 
in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. This project is mostly carried out by 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Habitat International Coalition has the 
most members among them. Not only MFIs but also financial companies, property 
developers, and construction suppliers involved in housing finance.  
MFIs in Korea accumulated practical experiences of microcredit and need to 
expand their outreach to help the poor more intensively. Although traditional mortgage 
finance was introduced in Korea in 2004 and established in Korean society, but there are 
many limitations for it to cover the need of the poor. Thus I believe that housing 
microfinance, which is a mixture of traditional mortgage loans and microcredit, should be 
included as a project of the MFIs in Korea to ensure high-quality residences for the poor. 
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5.3.1.2 Specific Housing Needs 
The specific structure of housing microfinance should reflect the real conditions 
and needs of the poor. There are spectacular differences in housing between different 
income levels. These conditions are also different depending on whether people live in 
big cities, small towns, or rural areas. 
First, I consider the living conditions in the big cities: Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, 
Incheon, Kwangju, Daejeon, and Woolsan. I mainly focus on the living conditions of the 
poor. The percentage of people with lower levels of income who own their own houses is 
very low, and the percentage of those who are forced to move is high. As a result, 
housing conditions are not stable for people with lower incomes. For people in Seoul, the 
percentage of people who own their houses is the lowest (31.8%), and the percentage of 
people who are forced to move is the highest (15.9%), as shown in table 26. 
Because the prices of houses in Seoul are so high, the housing expense burden is 
also high in Seoul. Thus, the housing burden for people with lower incomes in Seoul is 
expected to be much higher. Using the ratio, PIR ≡ (the house price) / (annual income), as 
an index for the housing expense burden, that for those with low income is 13.8 in Seoul. 
Considering the ratio, RIR ≡ [(rent charged)/(monthly income)] × 100, which is another 
index for the housing expense burden for renters, that for low- income households is 
higher than 20%. 
Next, I consider housing conditions for the poor in small towns. The main 
problem for the low-income households in these regions is that they live in old houses 
that have high housing expenses. Most of the poor live in houses built more than 20 years 
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ago, and the RIR ratio is higher than 20%. These characteristics are spectacular in the 
region whose main income is from agriculture, the Province of Chunnam and Chunbuk. 
Finally, I consider the housing conditions in rural areas. The main characteristic 
of houses in rural areas is that they are spacious but old. They need to be renovated or 
rebuilt, but the householders do not have sufficient money to do it. 
We need to notice that the effect of housing microfinance in rural areas has two 
different directions. First, the size of money, which is needed to carry out housing finance 
in rural area, is much smaller than that that in urban area. In this sense, the housing 
finance in rural areas can bear fruit without investing a lot of fund. On the contrary, there 
is not much business opportunity in rural area. This makes the income of the residence in 
rural areas unstable, which makes the financial status of the MFIs to offer housing 
microfinance to them also unstable. This is the reason why we need to consider carefully 
on the structures of housing microfinance. 
5.3.1.3 Suggestions on Structures of Housing Microfinance 
First, the terms and amount of housing finance should be adjusted to the needs of 
the poor. As mentioned in the previous section, this project is mainly targeted to renovate 
or rebuild the houses of the poor rather than to buy houses. Considering the relatively 
small amounts of money, the loans should be shorter and smaller than traditional 
mortgage loans. It is recommended that the terms of loans should be from one to three 
years maturity and that the amount of the loans should be below $10,000. The actual 
terms of the loans should reflect the conditions of the clients as well as the demand for 
rebuilding projects. To calculate exact terms with respect to maturity and amount of loan, 
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we need to use the data in table 26 ~ 29. But we need to wait some time until enough data 
to be accumulated and these data should be updated to consider the economic situation.  
Second, the MFIs should maintain a risk management system, because housing 
finance increases risk for the MFIs. The Korean MFIs have no experience of housing 
finance so far, implying that they do not have actual data from which they calculate 
rational interest rates and loan amounts. In these circumstances, it is better to start on a 
conservative basis and then make terms more flexible after acquiring some good results 
and acquiring skills from it. In this sense, I recommend that the MFIs give loans for 
houses only for those who have shown good outcomes in their enterprises at the first 
stage. By following this theme, this project can enhance the quality of life for the poor, 
while the risk related to this project can be maintained within controllable levels. 
The MFIs can manage risks by introducing insurance programs. Microinsurance 
programs to cover the microcredit problem can play a role as a risk management system. 
That is, in cases such as death, casualty or hospitalization during the repayment period for 
housing finance, the lenders should be protected by insurance. Mortgage insurance that is 
attached to the normal mortgage loans can be adjusted to housing finance with low 
premiums, and low coverage can also be utilized to make housing finance a promising 
project that is free from the detrimental effects of falls in the prices of houses. 
Finally, I need to consider the source of this project, because it requires 
substantial funds for housing finance. I believe that the MFIs can use policy funds for 
housing acquisition loans from the Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs, 
because the purpose of this fund is to help the poor to buy houses and to renovate or 
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rebuild houses. The MFIs can also carry out the role of assignee for commercial banks 
that carry out mortgage loans. As lenders reveal good results in their businesses, they can 
pay market interest rates. The percentage of short-term sources in banks has increased 
steadily over recent years (42.6% in 2001 to 52.0% in 2006). Thus, housing microfinance 
is a good option for banks in view of this phenomenon. However, banks do not have 
well-developed skills for dealing with the poor. Thus, by cooperating with the MFIs, both 
parties could benefit substantially. 
5.3.2 Supports for Education and Health Care of the Poor 
5.3.2.1 Supports for Education of the Poor 
As already stated above for the SSB, the MFIs in Korea offer education for 
starting businesses after clients are accepted as beneficiaries of microcredit. That is, it is 
the responsibility of applicants to propose business ideas and to be ready to start them. 
The MFIs then assess the business plans. It is not enough, however, to get basic business 
knowledge. To select an appropriate business type and to get proper skill to do it is 
also—maybe more—important. Thus, the MFIs need to take part in vocational training 
for the poor. 
However, the MFIs do not need to establish independent vocational training 
programs, because there are already lots of training programs in Korea (see table 30). 
What the MFIs need to do is to try to link the training programs and microcredit, by 
opening classes to give information about microfinance and its supply and demand in the 
real world. After knowing all the aspects of microenterprises, trainees can build sturdy 
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and specific business plans that result in high probabilities of success and, thus, high 
repayment ratios. 
Thus far, education has had a crucial role in achieving rapid economic growth in 
Korea with a huge contribution to improving human capital. Thus, more investment in 
education is necessary to accelerate economic growth. From a social welfare viewpoint, 
we need to introduce public welfare projects to relieve the burden of tuition for the 
children of low-income families. Under the current law regulating compulsory education 
until middle school, the tuition waiver for middle school is applied nationwide. Thus, the 
whole cost for education in high school and above should be covered by the parents. If 
the poor are not given money for education, then their poverty will continue in the lives 
of their children. 
The MFIs need to provide loans to improve the education of the poor. 
Considering that the heaviest burden in education is tuition at university, loans for this 
should be urgently introduced by the MFIs. I believe that such loans should be provided 
without collateral and with sufficiently long maturities that extend until the students get 
jobs. The interest rates charged for these loans should be lower than the market rate. This 
would make the cost of learning cheaper and would give incentives for the poor to get 
higher education. Similar loans for higher education are provided through the Korean 
Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC), which is an affiliated organization of the 
Financial Services Commission. However, these loans are not restricted to the poor, and 
the lending terms24 are not flexible. If the MFIs want to offer student loans, they should 
                                                 
24 The interest rate is around the market rate, 7.65% for 2008, and the maximum maturity is 20 
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establish more flexible conditions than those offered by the KHFC. The MFIs need to 
have a strategic cooperation with the KHFC, because they have knowledge on how to 
treat the poor, while the KHFC has experience in managing long-term loans. Through 
this, the MFIs could either carry out the role of assignee for the KHFC in the field of 
education loans for the poor or let the KHFC issue student loan-based securities using 
these student loans as underlying assets that facilitate the MFIs’ student loans. 
The loans for education are a starting point to secure the education of the poor. 
More favorable policies for the poor by the government and society are also needed. I 
suggest preferential treatment by universities in granting admission to students from poor 
families. This can be rationalized by the fact that the poor cannot get enough 
opportunities to develop their potential and support for study places. Other students can 
utilize private institutions in Korea, where they can get private tutoring and advice from 
specialists in education. The cost of private education is much greater than the tuition 
because of fierce competition, and it acts as an impediment to proceeding into good 
universities. This inequality in private education could be lessened if the NGOs and 
volunteer groups provided the poor with study programs together with places of study. 
It is also suggested that poor students, after gaining admission, should be treated 
preferentially when allotting dormitories, which are limited and cover only a small 
proportion of registering students. In cases where there is no dormitory available at all, 
local governments should let them use cheap residential houses that local governments 
manage. 
                                                                                                                                                 
years, depending on various product designs. 
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5.3.2.2 Supports for the Expenditure of Health Care 
5.3.2.2.1 The Current Health Care System in Korea 
The Korean health care system is composed of the National Health Insurance 
system (NHI) and Medical Aid. People who use the services of the NHI have to pay, but 
those who use the services of Medical Aid do not. Enrollment for the NHI is required by 
law for all Koreans residing in Korea, except for Medical Aid beneficiaries. For the 
percentages of each type, see table 31. 
The payment of contributions to the NHI is the responsibility of employers and all 
members of households. The contributions of employees who are insured are based on 
their salaries. The current contribution rate for insured employees is 5.08% of their 
average monthly salary. The contributions of the insured employees are paid by both 
employees and employers. For the self-employed, the contributions for an insured person 
are calculated by using a formula that takes account of the person’s property, income, 
motor vehicles, age, and gender; i.e., monthly contribution = contribution points × value 
per point (around $1,500). 
Persons with the NHI who receive health care treatments pay certain portions of 
the health care costs as co-payments. In order to curtail overuse of health care services, 
and to lessen the concentration of medical services in large urban hospitals, the co-
payments for outpatient and inpatient services have been set differently according to the 
level and type of medical institutions (see table 32 for details). 
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Persons who receive services from Medical Aid are separated into two types. 
Type 1 is the group with poorer economic circumstances than Type 2, and there is no co-
payment for inpatients except for pharmacy, $0.50 each. The payments are made by the 
Medical Aid Fund, which is managed by the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Family 
Affairs. For outpatients, a small co-payment, from $1 to $2, is charged. There is a co-
payment ceiling, which is $50 per month. When individuals of Type 1 reach the ceiling 
threshold, they are exempted from any further payments. This is to alleviate the financial 
burden on households of catastrophic or high-cost diseases and, thus, to help prevent 
them from falling into bankruptcy. However, even Type 1 individuals pay the full 
expenses for treatment of uninsured diseases with the NHI. 
The Type 2 group consists of individuals with slightly better but still poor 
economic circumstances. The co-payment rate for these individuals is generally 15%, and 
the ceiling is $1,200 per six months. The Type 2 individuals also pay the full expenses for 
treatment of uninsured diseases with the NHI, as do Type 1 individuals. 
5.3.2.2.2 Problems with the Current System and Suggestions 
Although the current system seems comprehensive, it has some problems. I 
suggest several policy changes to prevent illness from having serious effects on poor 
households. 
First, it is not so easy for the poor to pay the premiums of the NHI. The rate of 
delinquency in payments of the NHI premiums, as of July 2009, was 10%. That is, 
1,992,798 households among the 19,005,339 total households failed to pay for three 
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consecutive months. The amount of nonpayments was $1,655 million. The households 
who do not pay are not covered by the NHI. 
Table 33 shows the composition of nonpayments to the NHI. The percentages for 
the no-wealth category in number were 14.5% and 9.4% for the number and amount, 
respectively, while the corresponding percentages for the little-wealth category were 75.0% 
and 75.9%. These numbers imply that the nonpayment of the no-wealth group is not very 
great. Perhaps these households cannot pay the NHI premiums because they have more 
urgent commitments. However, this can lead to serious results if they suffer illnesses or 
accidents that require medical treatment. 
To keep the poor covered by the NHI, the government needs to lower the 
premiums for the poorest group among the NHI payers, because the NHI is for public 
insurance and, thus, this should also play a role as a social safety net. Together with this 
policy, I suggest that the MFIs offer loans to cover the NHI premiums. The amounts of 
these loans do not need to be huge, but the conditions of repayment should be flexible to 
help the poor manage their everyday spending. 
Second, the amounts of co-payment required for both the NHI and the Medical 
Aid are at times burdensome for the poor. The co-payment percentages under the NHI are 
20% for catastrophic or high-cost diseases and 20% (inpatient) or 30% to 50% 
(outpatient). Even people with Type 2 Medical Aid cover are liable for co-payment, and 
the ceiling of this is $1,200 per six months. This can be disastrous if a patient has 
catastrophic or high-cost diseases such as chronic dysfunction of the kidneys, bleeder’s 
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disease or cancer. The number of catastrophic or high-cost diseases in 2008 was 630,000 
and that for cancer was 670,000. 
In this sense, there is urgent need for a public welfare project to relieve the burden 
of medical expenses for the members of low-income households. This can be done by 
microinsurance and/or loans for health care together with continuous efforts by the 
government to lower the burden of co-payment for the poor. 
In December 2008, the MFI and insurance companies decided to launch the 
microinsurance product. By purchasing microinsurance, it is claimed that, with a 
premium of less than $180, the contractor can get a benefit of $5,000 to $10,000 in case 
of death, casualty or hospitalization. In addition, a contractor from low-income families 
does not need to pay the whole premium but only 5% because the Microfinance 
Foundation pays the remaining 95%. 
Loans for medical expenses are listed as projects offered by the MIF, which was 
established as a public foundation in March 2008. The project is, however, under 
construction. I think the main strategies to develop this project should be as follows. First, 
the repayment schedule should be flexible and take account of the economic and health 
conditions of the individuals involved. Second, standardized small amounts of money 
should be given to needy individuals without collateral at first, and then progressive loans 
can be given based on their previous repayment history. The reasons for giving small 
amounts of money are to cover a larger number of the poor and to provide incentives to 
induce repayments for larger loans later. In designing this project, we should not neglect 
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the typical problem with respect to health insurance, which is moral hazard. Thus, a 
check system should be established for the appropriateness of medical treatments. 
Note that the current health care system mainly focuses on cure after the diagnosis 
of a disease, and it mainly supports Western medicine for treatments. The NHI favors 
covering the expense of treatment by Western medicine rather than by traditional Oriental 
medicine. For example, the NHI does not cover the expense of physical therapy by 
traditional Oriental medicine. It is desirable, however, that more concern be given to 
prevention and traditional herbal medicine to keep society healthy and, thus, to lower the 
cost of health care. 
Finally, there should be efforts by both the public and the private sectors to 
improve the everyday life of the population so that they can live in a clean and healthy 
environment. The major environmental projects should be water supply and satisfactory 
toilets in rural areas, considering their effects on the environment and health. The 
government can give some subsidies. This can be carried out under the social enterprise 
schemes that are discussed later. 
5.3.3 Expansion of Branches 
Note that post offices that are branches of Korea Post, which is under the control 
of the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, also offer finance products including savings 
and insurance. Besides the main offices and eight local branches in big cities, there were 
a total of 3,669 post offices as of 2007. The amount of financial services has steadily 
increased because there are several benefits from them including exemption from the 
deposit insurance and less regulation in designing their product compared with the 
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normal financial companies. They do not use their deposits to provide loans to the 
account holders, but they use them to invest in financial assets, etc. (see tables 34 and 35 
for details). 
To carry out the microsaving, microinsurance, and other projects that are 
suggested in the previous sections, the MFIs need more branches as contact points for 
customers. If the postal finance service could be changed into microfinance services or 
even if they did not change, the MFIs could use the nationally distributed post offices as 
their branches. 
5.3.4 Economy of Scale 
In Korea, many public policies are carried out by the government or by assignees 
using government funds to help the poor for various purposes (see table 36 for the 
amount of current public financial service projects targeting the poor). If those kinds of 
tasks could be carried out by the MFI, which is the transformation of the postal finance 
service, then efficiency could be improved through economy of scale so that transaction 
costs would be reduced. Therefore, the effects for the poor and for society would be 
improved, compared with the current situation, even if the same amount of funds were 
invested. 
5.4 Welfare Aspects of Microfinance 
If microenterprises by the poor produce externalities that produce additional 
benefits for society, it is appropriate for social planners to give them additional favors. 
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The basic notion of social enterprise has roots in this idea, and I suggest several ideas 
based on this concept in the following sections. 
5.4.1 Social Enterprise Policies in Korea 
Although microcredit from the MFIs can help the poor to overcome their poverty, 
the project has some limitations: the microenterprise should compete in the market to 
survive; and its success is for those who operate it, not for the whole society. The way to 
overcome these limitations is for the poor to target social enterprises. 
Social enterprises perform business activities such as production and sales of 
goods or services while working toward a social objective of helping local residents to 
lead a life of better quality by offering social services or jobs to disadvantaged people. In 
short, they are enterprises that do something good for society while making a profit. In 
other words, Social Enterprises an enterprise that is based on business and market 
principles, but is dedicated to using its resources to helping disadvantaged populations 
and society in general. The demand for social services in Korea is increasing as 
manufacturing industries have dwindled away, society is aging, and the number of 
couples where both must work is increasing. I listed examples of social enterprises in 
table 37. 
As an effort to foster social enterprises, the Ministry of Labor of the Korean 
Government enacted the Social Enterprise Promotion Act in April 2007. In a bid to 
nurture growth and good performance of social enterprises, the Government gives social 
enterprises strong support in several ways. First, there is financial assistance. When a 
person specializing in accounting or marketing is newly hired, a subsidy of $1,200 per 
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month per person is granted for up to three persons. In addition, for a business project 
that is chosen to be performed for a social enterprise, a subsidy of $7,900 per month per 
person and social insurance premiums (8.5% of the labor cost) are granted for those who 
participate in the project. Furthermore, loans for facilities and leases for the place of 
business are available. 
Second, the Government provides services for the establishment and operation of 
social enterprises. At present, there are three specialized agencies for assisting with the 
establishment of businesses, four specialized consulting firms for business operations, 
and one accounting agency offering assistance to existing or would-be social enterprises. 
Moreover, the Government supports the establishment of regional or occupational 
networks and the creation of training/education programs for future social entrepreneurs. 
Third, there are tax incentives. The Government revised the Special Tax 
Treatment Control Act in December 2007 to reduce the corporate and income taxes 
imposed on social enterprises by 50% and to treat all donations by a private company as a 
financial loss within the limit of 5% of the corporate income. Additionally, the 
Government encourages the ministries and agencies of the local governments and other 
public organizations to purchase goods and services from social enterprises. 
To foster social enterprises in a short period, based on the trust of society, the 
Ministry of Labor certified social enterprises. The requirements of certification are as 
follows: (1) the enterprise should have the proper organization, as listed in the Law; (2) 
the enterprise should employ salaried employees; (3) the enterprise should pursue social 
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purposes; (4) the enterprise should have democratic decision processes; and (5) the 
enterprise should make a positive profit. 
In October 2007, the Ministry of Labor certified social enterprises for the first 
time. As of September 2008, there were 108 social enterprises. When these certified 
social enterprises are broken down into categories of occupation, 21 of the certified social 
enterprises are engaged in environmental projects; 13 are in nursing or domestic service; 
14 are in social welfare; five are in culture; five are in education; five are in child care; 
four are in health care; and 36 are in other occupations. By types of organization, 43 are 
classified as companies under the Commercial Law; 21 are corporations under the Civil 
Law; 21 are nonprofit organizations; 13 are social welfare organizations; nine are 
consumers’ cooperatives; and one is an agricultural cooperative. 
In conclusion, if social objectives were combined with energetic and forward-
looking entrepreneurship and support from the MFIs, the social enterprise should result in 
remarkable progress in social integration. The social enterprises will bring fundamental 
changes to the society, help solve serious social problems, and activate the creative 
energies of a lot of people. 
5.4.2 For the Poor by the Poor 
Usually the poor who reside in rural areas do not have enough business 
opportunities, and it is difficult to be competitive even if they start new microenterprises 
because of deficiencies in marketing skills and social networks. However, based on the 
protection of social enterprises, there are a lot of business activities that target the poor 
and that can be done by the poor, including those who live in rural areas. There has been 
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a steady increase in state spending in the public service sector, which may be the main 
field of action of social enterprises (see table 38 for details). Thus, the opportunities for 
microenterprises to gain opportunities through targeting the poor are likely to be 
increased. The business concept for this can be called for the poor by the poor. By 
focusing on this kind of approach, microfinance can have broader effects on society, 
accomplishing social equity and performing customized services for the poor. 
One of these examples is the serving of food for schools. In Korea, education in 
elementary and middle school is mandatory, and the food service is usually provided 
either by the school or by a company chosen and paid by each student. For students in the 
low-income group, the payments are covered by the government or meals are delivered to 
them by the companies assigned. The statistics for these students are not released. Based 
on the total number of students under age of 18 (11 million) and the absolute poverty 
ratio in 2006 (5.7%), the estimated number of poorly-fed children is 620 thousand. There 
are catering companies that target students from the low-income group or that target 
schools whose percentage of poor students is high in big cities. These companies obtain 
certification as social enterprises and can have some protection until they can compete in 
the market. If these companies have a continuous market, they can easily extend the 
scope of their businesses by serving food for the army or other companies in the 
neighborhood. In turn, other types of social enterprises may supply raw foodstuff to these 
catering companies. A chain of social enterprises can result if there is policy guidance, 
incentive, and education for them. 
Another example of this scheme is the provision of insurance agents for the MFIs. 
It has been suggested in previous sections that the MFIs should provide microinsurance 
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and that the postal finance services should be turned into MFIs. In those cases, not only 
the demand for insurance but also insurance agents could be increased. The role of 
insurance agents is to sell microinsurance products, to advice, and to help clients when 
accidents occur. The poor can play useful roles as sellers as well as buyers, because they 
know what the poor need. The current number of life insurance agents is 215,000. If 
MFIs will carry out microinsurance, job creation and employment effect from it will be 
huge and the income from the job will be valuable aid to overcome the status of poverty. 
The applicants for microcredit and the MFIs together can find many of these 
kinds of business opportunities which can be done for the poor by social enterprises. By 
focusing on this approach (for the poor by the poor), microenterprises can achieve 
remarkable success in their businesses and MFIs will be able to give more help for the 
poor. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Although the history of microfinance in Korea is less than 10 years, but 
government circles as well as the academic world have an enthusiastic interest in 
microfinance. If Korean society can successfully adapt basic principles and techniques of 
microfinance in the Korean context, it will contribute to promote business opportunities 
and facilitating empowerment of the poor. 
This chapter focuses on finding optimal strategies for the development of 
microfinance in Korea. I proposed several optimal strategies for the development of 
microfinance in the future. (1) Introducing and enforcing group lending, because group 
lending can solve two major problems in microfinance, adverse selection by assortative 
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mating and moral hazard by monitoring group members’ transactions. (2) Letting MFIs 
(Microfinance Institutions) carry out both microsaving and microinsurance. (3) 
Establishing independent committees to mediate disputes regarding microcredit issues, 
which can solve commitment problem. (4) Expanding microfinance services by letting 
MFIs handle housing microfinance and loans for education and health care. (5) 
Encouraging social enterprise to help the poor overcome their state of poverty. 
In conclusion, appropriate social objectives and forward looking entrepreneurship 
when properly supported by MFIs can bring remarkable progress in social integration and 
help the poor overcome their state of poverty. 
  
 144 
 
Table 25. Maturity Structure of Mortgage Loans from Commercial Banks 
 (Unit: $ Billion, (%)) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
~ 1 Year 11.4 (7.5) 20.7 (12.2) 29.3 (15.4) 24.1 (11.1)  
39.1 
(17.9) 
1~3 Year 95.6 (62.3) 81.3 (47.9) 54.0 (28.4) 41.0 (18.9) 
3~10 Year 30.5 (19.9) 32.6 (19.2) 41.5 (21.8) 41.2 (19.0) 58.7 (26.9) 
10 Year ~ 15.8 (10.3) 35.1 (20.7) 65.5 (34.4) 110.8 (51.0) 120.5 (55.2)
Total 153.0 (100) 169.7 (100) 190.3 (100) 217.1 (100) 218.3 (100) 
 
Source: The Bank of Korea, Current Status and Future of Mortgage Finance in Korea, 
2007. 
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Table 26.  Ratio for who Owns House and the Ratio for who is Enforced to Move, 
2005 
(unit : %) 
Income 
classification 
Seoul 
Pu-
san 
Tae-
gu 
In-
cheon 
Kwang-
ju 
Dae-
jeon 
Wool-
san 
The ratio 
who 
owns 
house 
Low* 
level 
31.8 50.8 44.3 55.3 47.8 46.1 45.4 
Middle
* level 
39.8 54.8 52.0 61.9 52.7 54.1 58.0 
High* 
level 
59.2 52.9 72.7 72.1 67.3 67.8 67.2 
The 
ratio* 
who is 
enforced 
to move 
Low 
level 
15.9 10.4 13.8 10.6 8.2 5.3 8.7 
Middle 
level 
10.4 6.2 13.0 11.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 
High 
level 
7.7 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Notes: * Low level: 1st Decile ~ 3rd Decile, Middle level: 4th Decile ~ 8th Decile, High 
level : 9th Decile ~ 10th Decile 
           ** The ratio of households that choose burden of residence is severe/ the landlord 
told to leave as the reason to move 
Source: The Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 2005, Survey on the actual 
state of residing condition and demand for house. 
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Table 27.  PIR and RIR for the households in big cities, 2005 
(unit : times, %) 
Income 
classification 
Seoul 
Pu-
san 
Tae-
gu 
In-
cheon 
Kwang-
ju 
Dae-
jeon 
Wool-
san 
PIR 
Low 
level 
13.8 9.0 7.0 7.3 8.0 9.0 5.6 
Middle 
level 
6.9 3.5 3.7 3.4 2.6 3.9 3.0 
High 
level 
6.2 2.3 3.1 2.9 1.9 4.1 2.6 
RIR 
Low 
level 
34.5 31.4 21.7 26.4 31.2 31.9 25.1 
Middle 
level 
21.9 15.1 12.5 17.1 13.8 17.4 15.8 
High 
level 
20.3 15.4 11.7 11.5 9.2 16.4 10.4 
 
Notes: * The number is driven by using the average value, but using median is also 
possible. 
 
Source: The Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 2005, Survey on the actual 
state of residing condition and demand for house. 
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Table 28.  Ages of the House and RIR for the Households in Small Towns, 2005 
(unit : year, %) 
Income 
classification 
Kyung 
gi 
Kang 
won 
Chung 
buk 
Chung 
nam 
Chun 
buk 
Chun 
nam 
Kyung 
buk 
Age 
of the 
house 
Low 
level 
11.5 15.6 16.9 18.2 21.7 22.2 17.4 
Middle 
level 
13.3 18.5 19.2 20.8 23.8 24.4 19.0 
High 
level 
9.9 12.7 13.6 13.2 14.6 16.5 13.2 
RIR 
Low 
level 
31.2 27.6 27.5 26.7 27.1 21.5 22.0 
Middle 
level 
19.7 11.8 12.4 12.3 11.0 11.3 12.0 
High 
level 
13.3 6.5 4.3 11.3 5.0 10.2 13.0 
 
Notes: * I extracted 7 regions among 10 regions based on the distance from Seoul. 
Source:  same as before 
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Table 29.  Space per Person and the Age of the House in Rural Areas, 2005 
(unit : 3.3m2, year) 
Income 
classification 
Kyung 
gi 
Kang 
won 
Chung 
buk 
Chung 
nam 
Chun 
buk 
Chun 
nam 
Kyung 
buk 
Space 
per 
Person 
Low 
level 
7.9 7.4 6.7 7.7 9.0 7.7 8.6 
Middle 
level 
6.2 8.2 7.0 8.9 9.6 8.3 9.1 
High 
level 
7.6 6.3 6.4 6.0 7.2 6.3 6.8 
Age of 
the 
House 
Low 
level 
13.0 20.8 19.0 20.2 22.9 22.0 18.2 
Middle 
level 
9.9 13.0 14.2 12.0 14.3 16.6 12.7 
High 
level 
9.7 10.3 10.8 10.7 11.8 15.8 9.9 
 
Notes: * I extracted 7 regions among 10 regions based on the distance from Seoul. 
Source: Same as before 
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Table 30.  Vocational Training Programs in Korea 
 (Unit: Thousand People, $ Million) 
 Trainees* Budget** 
Nurture Training 11 24.6 
Government Entrusted Training 16 90.0 
Jobless Employment Training 18 52.8 
Employment Promotion Training 9 12.6 
Employment 
Insurance 
Jobless 
Reemployment 
Training 
53 124.2 
 
Sources: *   Ministry of Labor (2005a). 2005 Labor White Paper. 
               ** Ministry of Labor (2005b). Statistics for Vocational Ability Development 
2000 ~ 2004. 
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Table 31.  Number of Covered Population, 2007 
Classification Coverage (10,000) (%) 
Total 4,967 100 
NHI Subtotal 4,782 96.3 
Employee Insured 2,942 59.2 
Self-Employed 1,840 37.1 
Medical Aid Subtotal 185 3.7 
Type 1 106 2.1 
Type 2 79 1.6 
 
Source: National Health Insurance Corporation 
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Table 32.  Co-Payment in NHI 
Classification Co-payment 
Inpatient 10~20% of total treatment 
out 
patient 
Tertiary care hospital Per-visit consultation fee + 50% of treatment cost 
General hospital 50% of (treatment cost + Per-visit consultation fee) 
Hospital 40% of (treatment cost + Per-visit consultation fee) 
Clinic 30% of treatment cost 
Pharmacy 30% of total cost 
 
Sources: National Health Insurance Corporation 
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Table 33.  Composition of Non Payment of NHI 
(Unit: $ million, %) 
Classification Number of 
Households 
 Amount  
Relative Ratio Relative Ratio 
Non Payment 1,992,798 100 1,655 100 
No Wealth 288,280 14.5 156 9.4 
Little Wealth25 1,496,181 75.0 1,256 75.9 
Others 208,337 10.5 243 14.7 
 
Sources: National Health Corporation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Total wealth of household should be less than $45,000. 
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Table 34.  The Number of Postal Offices in Nation wide 
Total 
4th 
level 
5th 
level 
6~7th 
level 
Military 
Post 
office 
Semi- 
official 
Post office
Postal agency 
licensed postal 
office 
Postal 
agency 
Office 
3,669 118 129 1,706 25 766 85 840 
 
Source: Korea Post 2007 Annual Report 
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Table 35.  Outcome of Postal Finance 
(Unit: $100,000) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Deposit received 
(average balance) 
300,586 332,507 342,000 365,882 384,479 391,872 
Insurance asset 
(end balance) 195,788 212,959 228,973 200,905 207,929 228,576 
Total 496,356 536,943 555,000 559,489 592,408 622,269 
 
Source: Korea Post 2007 Annual Report 
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Table 36.  Current Public Financial Service Projects Targeting the Poor 
(Unit: $ thousands ) 
Organization Name Project Name Funds Use Budget for 2008
Ministry of Education, 
Science, and 
Technology 
Loan for school 
expense 
Loan for school 
expense 
2,348,600 
Fellowship for the 
poorest 
Fellowship 59,000 
Ministry of Health 
and Welfare 
Loan for the Poor Self support group 2,000 
Assistance for single 
parent family 
Living expenses 2,000 
Loan for self support 
for the disabled 
Self support for 
the disabled 
16,000 
Korea Workers’
Compensation and
Welfare Service 
Employee 
Living expenses 34,000 
Loan based on salary 20,000 
School expenses 88,900 
Employee with 
industrial disaster 
Living expenses 11,000 
School expenses 5,100 
Regional Credit
Guarantee 
Foundation 
Guarantee for the
microenterprises 
Guarantee for 
microcredit 
961,036 
Guarantee for 
liquidity loan 
33,552 
Human Resource
Development 
Service of Korea 
School expense loan 
for employee 
School expense 88,000 
School expense support 
for SMEs worker 
School expense 9,500 
Korea Employment
Promotion Agency 
for the Disabled 
Loan for living 
expenses 
Living expenses 4,000 
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Table 36 (cont.) 
(Unit: $ thousands ) 
Organization Name Project Name Funds Use Budget for 2008
Korea Asset 
Management 
Corporation 
Transfer loan Transfer loan 1,235,29426 
Microfinance 
Foundation 
Microcredit for 
traditional market 
 1,000 
Total 4,918,980 
 
Source: Korea Institute of Finance 
  
                                                 
26 The amount of loan by KAMCO is estimated based on the assurance multiple and assurance 
ratio; final amount = (actual amount * assurance multiple) / assurance ratio = ($ 150,000 
thousand * 7) / 0.83 = $ 1,235,294 thousand. 
 157 
 
Table 37.  Examples of Social Enterprises 
Type Specific examples 
Self-reliant project Project to create social jobs (Ministry of Labor) 
Social 
services 
Support for 
the disabled 
Program for teaching assistant for disabled children, 
Assistance for the severely disabled (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare) 
Child care 
& education 
Project to operate local child care centers (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare), Clean schools , After school education 
(Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development) 
Patient caring 
Program to send helpers to the elderly living alone, helpers 
for new born and their mothers (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare) 
Environment 
Job creation in eco regions (Ministry of Environment), 
Project to care wood (Forest Service) 
Culture & 
sports 
Pool of part-time instructors in traditional Korean music, 
Support for elderly people’s sports activities (Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism) 
Support for 
youth 
Support for youth after school, operation of pool of 
instructors for youth (Commission on Youth Protection) 
Others 
Project to innovate local welfare services (Ministry of Health 
and Welfare) 
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Table 38.  Trend in the State Spending on Public Sector 
                                                                                                                 (Unit : $ 1 thousand) 
Classification 2007 2008 
Amount 
increased 
Ratio in 
increase 
( % ) 
Social Welfare 560,956 617,056 56,100 10.0 
Health Care 52,892 59,421 6,529 12.3 
Culture / Tour 28,619 31,652 3,033 10.6 
Environment 
Protection 
40,345 44,674 4,329 10.7 
Education 314,074 355,192 41,118 13.1 
Community 
Development 
26,715 31,300 4,585 17.2 
 
Source: The National Assembly Budget Office 
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Figure 10.  Monitoring Game in Group Lending 
 Monitor Does Not Monitor 
Monitor H - r - m, H - r - m b - m, H - r - c 
Does Not 
Monitor 
H - r - c, b - m b, b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 160 
 
Figure 11.  Commitment Problem without Meditation Procedure 
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Figure 12. The Effect of the Establishment of Independent Committee 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper mainly focuses on finding optimal strategies for the development of 
microfinance in Korea and on predicting the impact of microfinance in the future. 
First, this paper reviews and assesses the impact of microfinance in Korea. I 
suggested that recent phenomena of income polarization and credit rationing in the 
financial market are evidence that microfinance is needed in Korea. Although the Korean 
economy has made great strides, the difference in the income between the poor and the 
rich has gotten much greater. The foreign currency crisis in 1997 deepened income 
polarization and the impact is continuing. Banks choose to ration credit instead of 
increasing interest rate (when there was an excess demand for loans) which would lead 
adverse selection and moral hazards. The poor are in an inferior position when it comes 
to getting funds when credit ration happens because they cannot offer collateral and they 
need money urgently.  
This paper analyzes the factors which impact up on the survival of 
microenterprises using two econometric methods (the logit regression model and the Cox 
proportional hazard model). Attributes of microenterprises, such as organizational form, 
sex of the owner(s), income level of the owner(s), and types of business are chosen as 
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independent variables which may have impact on the survival. The results from the 
econometric models indicate that more support should be provided when the income level 
of the owner(s) became less if we want to make more microenterprises survive. The 
direction of impact or the relative magnitudes of impact is not exactly the same between 
two econometric methods. Therefore, proper interpretation and fine tuning are needed in 
applying the results into the real microcredit world. 
Next, this paper outlines the impact of microfinance on the income level of the 
poor and the repayment ratio of microcredit. This task is carried out by a simulation 
which is an agent based model. The simulation of the agent based model shows that two 
different policy directions are needed to guarantee the success of microfinance. First, it is 
necessary to magnify positive impacts. There are at least two ways this can be done. You 
can increase the amount of microcredit to make it easier to start businesses and you can 
support an increase in the yield rate of return. Minimizing negative impacts is also 
important. This can be done by decreasing the interest rate charged by local money 
lenders and closely monitoring their behavior to see if they obey the usury law. 
Finally, I proposed several optimal strategies for the development of microfinance 
in the future. (1) Introducing and enforcing group lending, because group lending can 
solve two major problems in microfinance, adverse selection by assortative matching and 
moral hazard by monitoring group members’ transactions. (2) Letting MFIs 
(Microfinance Institutions) carry out both microsaving and microinsurance. (3) 
Establishing independent committees to mediate disputes regarding microcredit issues, 
which can solve commitment problem. (4) Expanding microfinance services by letting 
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MFIs handle housing microfinance and loans for education and health care. (5) 
Encouraging social enterprise to help the poor overcome their state of poverty. 
In conclusion, appropriate social objectives and forward looking entrepreneurship 
when properly supported by MFIs can bring remarkable progress in social integration and 
help the poor overcome their state of poverty. 
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